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FOREWORD
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland has commissioned this assess-
ment of the effects of possible NATO membership, in connection with the 
preparation of the Government’s Report on Finnish Foreign and Security 
Policy. This is the first assessment of its kind conducted at the request of 
the Finnish government since 2007: during the intervening decade, major 
strategic changes have occurred at the global, European and regional levels. 
We were not entrusted with voicing a preference for or against NATO mem-
bership. Nor were we requested to provide a pro-and-con balance-sheet 
type approach. Our task has been to provide an evaluation of the poten-
tial effects of membership, in the most clinical manner possible. This does 
not mean that all effects of membership would be equally straightforward: 
some, such as the treaty commitments integral to Atlantic Alliance mem-
bership, or the direct impact of belonging to NATO’s command structure 
are comparatively easy to describe. Others, such as the possible reactions of 
Russia to Finland’s entry into NATO or the consequences of possible Finn-
ish membership for the corresponding debate in Sweden are necessarily 
more probabilistic in nature. The text of the assessment reflects these dif-
ferences in the degrees of certainty.
We have adhered to a strict interpretation of our mandate, with one sub-
stantive exception. In our work it became immediately apparent that the 
choices made by Finland and Sweden (or vice versa) to join or not to join 
NATO, separately or together, could lead to different effects for the secu-
rity and defence of Finland. Thus, we have decided on our own initiative 
to extend our analysis to include a hypothesis whereby Sweden would join 
NATO but Finland would not, since this would change the regional strate-
gic and military status quo for Finland. 
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The report does not cover the consequences of possible NATO member-
ship of Finland for the Åland Islands, which are an autonomous part of Fin-
land. The relationship between the international agreements that cover the 
sui generis status of these islands and the undertakings implied in member-
ship need to be examined further. This was not possible within the time 
allotted to us.
We wish to express our gratitude towards the numerous individuals who 
kindly devoted their time to us in a number of capitals: their informed anal-
ysis and practical understanding has been indispensable to our work. How-
ever, the views expressed in this assessment are entirely our own. A special 
word of thanks is in order vis-à-vis the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
which has provided us with all of the necessary means to conduct our work, 
without seeking to influence its content at any juncture. 
Mats Bergquist, François Heisbourg, René Nyberg, Teija Tiilikainen 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. LEGACY. Finland has come a long way since the wars, hot and cold, of 
the twentieth century. In the process, the country has learned to man-
age complexity in international relations and security affairs, combin-
ing a demonstrated will to defend itself and to find a modus vivendi and 
establish a stable relationship with Russia. As the benign strategic con-
text of the post-Cold War era gives way to a harsher and less predicta-
ble dispensation, Finland needs to adapt yet again to changing circum-
stances. This assessment of the effects of possible NATO membership 
will fulfill its purpose if it contributes to that adaptation. 
2. EUROPE. Finland is a Western country, a member of the broader fami-
ly of like-minded democracies. In this regard, the post-Cold War era was 
a homecoming with EU membership in 1995. This European dimension 
is part and parcel of Finland’s new identity. As a result, Finland ceased to 
view itself as a non-aligned country once the EU treaties included mil-
itary assistance clauses, with its legislation being reviewed accordingly, 
even while maintaining its policy of not joining military alliances. Given its 
full European integration, Finland shares the broader strategic concerns 
of its EU partners, along with the rising challenges to both East and South 
of the continent. However, the EU does not possess the institutions and 
capabilities to deal with the full range of these strategic concerns by itself. 
Finland remains deeply aware that there is no solution to the specific stra-
tegic dilemma posed by its unpredictable neighbour, which requires con-
tinuous management. Nor is it prudent to assume that a common Euro-
pean security and defence policy (CSDP) capable of doing so will emerge 
in the foreseeable future. The same applies mutatis mutandis to regional 
cooperation, which is both absolutely necessary but clearly not sufficient 
given ongoing security challenges.
3. CONVERGENCE. Finland has developed a policy of engagement with 
all partners and organisations contributing each in their own way to 
security in Europe, notably the OSCE, Nordic cooperation, the EU and 
NATO. Finland, like Sweden, is nearly as close to the Atlantic Alliance as 
it is possible to be for a non-member state, reaching a plateau. This con-
vergence at military and diplomatic levels has in turn led to a considera-
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ble degree of interoperability between Finland and NATO. The practical 
difficulties that would have to be resolved were Finland to join NATO 
are quite limited. This is due both to Finland’s democratic credentials, 
and to the perception that Finland is a militarily serious country under-
pinned by the reality of its territorial defence. Finland’s Bündnisfähig-
keit, its practical readiness to be a full member of NATO, is correspond-
ingly high. From the NATO perspective, Finnish accession would be 
technically straightforward and – in all likelihood – acceptable to mem-
ber states. 
4. TOGETHERNESS. Finland and Sweden constitute a common strate-
gic space and have compelling reasons to make the same fundamen-
tal choices as to their future security and defence, whether on the basis 
of the current policy of convergence with NATO, short of membership, 
or with a view to joining the Atlantic Alliance. As Western and Euro-
pean democracies, they share the same Nordic and Baltic space, and 
they face the same strategic challenges and uncertainties in that region. 
This strategic reality applies notably to the security of the Baltic States. 
Throughout Finland’s history as an independent state, strategic deci-
sions taken by one of the two countries have had immediate and deci-
sive consequences for the other. By working together, Finland and Swe-
den can have greater influence inside or outside of NATO, as was the 
case in their decision to join the EU more than twenty years ago. Con-
versely, divergent choices in Finland and Sweden would produce new 
difficulties. Finland would be more exposed and vulnerable than it cur-
rently is if Sweden alone were to join NATO. This would also create a 
serious challenge for Stockholm, the return of the ‘Finland question’, 
which had waned with Helsinki’s ability to stabilise its relationship with 
the USSR and move into Western structures during the Cold War. Fin-
land joining NATO with Sweden staying out would create a strategically 
awkward situation, leaving Finland as a strategic outpost without terri-
torial continuity with NATO. 
5. RUSSIA. Finland, as a member of the EU and as a Western democra-
cy, shares with its partners a broad array of strategic concerns, calling 
for solidarity and common action. However, geography gives particular 
importance to Russia, with which Finland shares a 1340 kilometre-long 
border. As an unsatisfied power, Russia has made unpredictability a stra-
tegic and tactical virtue, underpinned by an impressive degree of polit-
ical and military agility. Russia has adopted a revisionist stand towards 
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the norms and principles governing the European order. It regards the 
Atlantic Alliance as an adversary and considers any NATO enlarge-
ment as a threat to its national security. Hence, Russia will attempt to 
thwart any move by Finland or Sweden to join NATO. The historical 
record of previous NATO enlargements, despite the fact that Finland is 
not viewed by Russia in the same light as Ukraine or Georgia, indicate 
that political and economic reactions may be strong, even harsh, nota-
bly during the transition phase. Even while stopping short of the use of 
force, specific counter-measures would be difficult to predict.    
6. DECISION-MAKING. Finland’s accession to NATO – if such were the 
country’s choice – would involve intricate diplomatic and political pro-
cesses not least since accession would probably take place in a more 
charged international atmosphere than previous enlargements. Exter-
nally, there would be every reason to shorten the transition period 
between the membership application and admission into NATO, since 
this would be the time of maximum antagonism by Russia. Howev-
er, even if a ‘fast-track’ accession process could be agreed upon by the 
members of NATO, it would run counter to the probable need to man-
age two membership processes in parallel in Finland and Sweden. These 
processes may involve referenda, with uncertain outcomes, which could 
lead to split decisions and their ensuing consequences. A possible fast 
track should not be allowed to interfere with the full democratic due 
process which such a weighty decision calls for. Indeed, an in-depth 
and possibly lengthy public debate has virtues of its own, if this por-
tentous issue is not to fall prey to the froth of short-term and superficial 
discussion.
We can but underline how fundamental such a decision would be. It would 
represent a sea change in policy, which must be considered as a commit-
ment for the long-term. A small country such as Finland has good reason to 
be careful when considering choices of grand strategy.
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CHAPTER I.  
THE LEGACY OF HISTORY:  
AN UNLIKELY STORY OF SURVIVAL
Each country’s strategic choices are shaped not only by its geography and 
its geopolitical environment, but also by its historical experience. What 
has worked or failed in the past in terms of collective security and defence, 
or indeed its absence, informs future options. This also applies to Finland, 
even if its experience has been exceptional in many regards.
After the strategic offensive by the Red Army in June–July 1944 failed to 
break the Finnish defences, Stalin opted for a political solution to force Fin-
land out of the war. The Armistice of September 1944 required the rapid 
demobilisation of the army of 550,000 men plus 200,000 women with a 
population of less than four million at the time. Finland was also required 
to open its airports and naval facilities to the Allied (exclusively Soviet) Forc-
es and to drive 200 000 German troops from Northern Finland. With the 
presence of an Allied (essentially Soviet) Control Commission in the coun-
try and the leasing to the Soviet Union of the naval base of Porkkala, just 
30 km west of Helsinki, Finland was at its weakest and most vulnerable. But 
with Stalin’s mind concentrated on securing victory and reaching Berlin, the 
option to launch a new attack in order to occupy Finland was no more.
The ratification of the Peace Treaty of Paris in September 1947 marked a 
turning point and saw the Control Commission leave. A Friendship Treaty 
(Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance) imposed 
on Finland in April 1948 defined the relationship with the Soviet Union for 
decades to come. Finland never considered the treaty to be a military pact. 
It did not establish a framework of permanent foreign policy consultations 
and narrowed the Finnish military obligations to repel an attack in coop-
eration with the Soviet Union “by Germany or powers allied to Germany 
through Finnish territory”. The treaty was renewed in 1955, as a precondi-
tion for the return of the Porkkala base, and several times thereafter. Only 
after becoming a Member of the United Nations in December 1955, and 
the evacuation of the Soviet base in January 1956, could Finland embark on 
pursuing a policy of neutrality. The preamble to the Friendship Treaty notes 
“Finland’s desire to remain outside the conflicting interests of the Great 
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Powers”. Moscow never truly accepted Finnish neutrality and regarded the 
Friendship Treaty as the basis of its relations with Finland.
With early elections in March 1945 – while the Allies were still allied and 
unanimous in their support of free elections – Finland secured its political 
institutions and parliamentary democracy. The reorganised Security Police 
(1949) focused successfully on counterespionage. The last train carrying war 
reparations crossed the border in September 1952, a month after the closing 
ceremony of the Helsinki Summer Olympics. The unbroken military tradi-
tion and universal conscription allowed the Defence Forces to continue train-
ing a reserve force focused on territorial defence. Participating in UN Peace-
keeping operations since 1956 has provided the Defence Forces with military 
contacts and experience. In order to prevent provocations, a border zone of 
three to five kilometres was established. The Border Guards remained a mil-
itary organisation under the Ministry of the Interior in peacetime. The first 
major procurements from the Soviet Union, Sweden and the United King-
dom forced Finland to define basic rules of conduct. No military instructors 
from the seller country were accepted on Finnish soil. Instead, Finnish officers 
were sent abroad for training. Since the late 1950s, Finnish officers have stud-
ied at military colleges in France, Britain, Sweden and subsequently the Unit-
ed States (1964) and the Soviet Union (1971). By reinterpreting stipulations 
through diplomacy, the Defence Forces were able to cope with the military 
restrictions imposed by the Paris Peace Treaty.
Accomplished diplomacy was required to stabilise Finland’s position with Sta-
lin’s successors. The superior Finnish social and economic system played a 
decisive role. Although Finland had to tread a fine line politically, its market 
economy was able to turn the regulated bilateral trade with the Soviet Union 
to its favour. Becoming an associate member of the European Free Trade 
Association in 1961 and concluding a free trade agreement with the Europe-
an Economic Community in 1972 were milestones in cementing Finland as a 
Western country and society. The regulated bilateral trade that required the 
licensing of exports to the Soviet Union also provided the instrument to indi-
rectly adhere to COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls) export restrictions, which again was the prerequisite for acquiring 
Western technology and equipment for the Defence Forces.
The build-up of the Defence Forces was a long and protracted low-key pro-
cess eschewing the expression “armed neutrality”. The first jet fighter planes, 
Folland Gnats, were bought from Britain in 1958, to be later replaced by Soviet 
MiGs and Swedish Drakens. Only with a shift of the Finnish defence focus to 
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the North after the mid-1960s did the Finnish defence posture acquire a sta-
bilising regional role in Northern Europe, thus extending territorial defence 
over the entire country. The move to the North was accompanied by a delib-
erate policy of not building East-West roads in Finnish Lapland.
Unlike Sweden, which secretly enjoyed military guarantees from the US, 
Finland pursued a cautious policy towards the West. Despite intensive dip-
lomatic contacts with leading NATO members, Finland did not establish 
official contacts with NATO before the end of the Cold War. The same 
characterised military co-operation with Sweden. Despite military diploma-
cy, including visits by top commanders and personal relations, intensive mil-
itary co-operation between Finland and Sweden is a recent phenomenon. 
The mere existence of Sweden was of immense significance for post-war 
Finland as a neighbour, trade partner and a social model. 
By unilaterally declaring the military clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty null 
and void in September 1990, the Finnish Government lifted the last restric-
tions on its sovereignty. Although the stipulations of the Peace Treaty had 
not prevented Finland from developing its defence forces, the restrictions 
were a liability and a reminder of an existing droit de regard. The abroga-
tion of the Friendship Treaty in 1992 lifted the stigma that had cast a long 
shadow and restricted Finland’s freedom of action. Joining the European 
Union in 1995 marked the end of neutrality and the beginning of a policy of 
military non-alignment. The expression non-aligned was dropped in 2007 
and calibrated as “no membership in military alliances”.
The restoration of independence of the Baltic States in 1990 brought about 
a fundamental change to the geopolitical situation around the Baltic Sea. 
Control of the Southern shore of the Gulf of Finland and the Eastern shore 
of the Baltic Sea reverted to the Baltic States. 
Differences in the assessment of risk and military threats in the early 2000s 
led to diametrically different defence orientations in Finland and Sweden. 
Finland, a traditional force contributor to the UN since the beginning of 
blue-helmet operations in 1956 (UNEF Sinai), intensified its participation 
in NATO and EU operations, which provide additional training and even 
combat experience for the reserve force. But unlike Sweden, which placed 
a premium on developing an expeditionary capability forsaking territorial 
defence and suspending conscription from 2009 onwards, Finland neither 
gave up territorial defence nor contemplated abandoning conscription. Nor 
were the Border Guards turned into a police force.
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CHAPTER II.  
THE CHANGING STRATEGIC 
ENVIRONMENT
Since the drafting of the last assessment on the effects of possible NATO 
membership for Finland close to ten years ago, the strategic environment 
has undergone wrenching change. The post-Cold War era which began 
around 1990 has, in effect, been replaced by a multipolar dispensation 
which has yet to receive a name but some of whose main characteristics 
can be summarised as follows:
 ● The shift away from an order in which the United States was the sole 
superpower – indeed, some called it a ‘hyperpower’ – and in which 
the West, broadly speaking, tended to set the rules of international 
conduct.
 ● The rise of China as a potential peer competitor of the US, and the 
advent of East Asia as the main and most dynamic hub of a global 
economy in which the European Union has been underperforming.
 ● The emergence of attempts, notably via the BRICS nations, to set 
international rules outside of the Western nexus and, in the case of 
Russia, to revise the legal bases of the post-Cold War order in Europe.
 ● The limits of the ability of military power, mainly but not only Western, 
to secure decisive and desirable results in a broader Middle East in the 
throes of deep, sustained and often violent change.
These broad changes impose new constraints on America’s strategic reach, 
notably in Europe, and have thrown up new challenges for the European 
Union. This general “hardening” of the strategic context has specific impli-
cations for Finland and its security and defence choices.
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1. Russia as a dynamic and unsatisfied power
Russia is not the Soviet Union, although old habits die hard. The Russian 
default of 1998 led to spectacular growth and a surprisingly quick recovery 
boosted by the rapid rise in the oil price. Following the Norwegian example, 
the windfall was channelled into Sovereign Wealth Funds. Optimism and the 
spirit of reform came to an abrupt halt with the expropriation of Russia’s larg-
est oil company, Yukos, in 2003. It demonstrated arbitrariness and the lack of 
property rights in a country ruled by man, not by law. Subsequent tighten-
ing of the control of the political system and the media brought about funda-
mental changes to a society that had experienced an unprecedented period 
of individual and political liberty since the implosion of the Soviet Union. Rus-
sian political institutions remain weak and, unlike China or indeed the USSR, 
it has neither a system of succession nor a procedure to renew its leadership.
The essence of modernisation, structural reforms of the economy and the 
social system, were postponed and neglected. After a decade of unprece-
dented growth that saw a historic rise in living standards, Russia encoun-
tered the financial crisis in 2008 unprepared. With the help of the accumu-
lated reserves, companies and banks were bailed out and the subsequent 
rise in the oil price stabilised the economy for a while, but no reforms were 
initiated. After the collapse of the oil price in 2014, Russia could not repeat 
the bail-outs of 2008–09 without risking depleting its reserves. The Gov-
ernment is clueless in the face of a continuing downslide. Without growth 
and investments, stabilising the rouble and securing the reserves will not 
suffice. It will eventually lead to budget sequestration with dire social con-
sequences, which will ultimately affect military expenditure as well.
The implosion of the Soviet Union saw the territory directly controlled from 
Moscow shrink to pre-Petrine borders. Slavic and Orthodox lands from North 
Kazakhstan to Belarus and Ukraine became part of independent states.
The partnership with the West declined in stages until the war in Ukraine 
resulted in a sharp deterioration in relations. The abrogation of the ABM 
Treaty by the United States in 2001 alerted Russia to the need to safeguard 
its second strike capability as the foundation of its status as the other nucle-
ar superpower. The war in Georgia in 2008 demonstrated Russia’s willing-
ness to engage in wars beyond its borders. But the poor performance of the 
Russian Armed Forces during the war in Georgia also revealed that Russia’s 
military did not possess the required capabilities to support Moscow’s for-
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eign and security policy. The subsequent reforms turned the Russian mil-
itary around, as shown in the war in Ukraine starting in 2014 and in the 
large-scale projection of air power to Syria in late 2015.
The war in Ukraine and especially the annexation of Crimea is a transgres-
sion without precedent in Europe since the end of World War II. The viola-
tion of the fundamental principle of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act that borders 
can only be changed through negotiations was resented by the EU and the 
US as political revisionism. The West closed ranks and imposed sanctions 
on Russia. Russia miscalculated the mood in Ukraine, and misread the reac-
tions in the European Union (not least in Germany) and the United States. 
In turning to its single largest trading partner, China, Russia also misjudged 
the pragmatism of Beijing. China’s economy remains deeply involved with 
the American banking system and cannot circumvent financial sanctions 
imposed by Washington. The collapse of the oil price coupled with financial 
sanctions has weakened the Russian economy significantly and increased 
isolation. Through its air power and special forces in Syria, Russia has 
re-emerged as a key player in the Middle East and been partly able to break 
the isolation through direct negotiations with the United States.
In a political and military corollary to the war in Ukraine, Russia stepped up 
its manoeuvres and resumed flight patrols at levels not seen since the Cold 
War. Snap exercises and aggressive flight patterns plus suspected incursions 
of submarines into Swedish waters, combined with unprecedented hostile 
talk about nuclear weapons, startled the West and especially Russia’s neigh-
bours. Despite the fact that the Russian nuclear doctrine, last updated in 
December 2015, has not changed in its fundaments since its initial formu-
lation in 1993, provocative talk at high official levels about nuclear weap-
ons and their demonstrative inclusion in major exercises and air patrolling, 
alerted the Western public. This is enhanced by Russia’s capacity for action 
and ability to take decisions quickly. It is a policy of ambiguity, even taking 
pride in a decision-making process as inscrutable and unpredictable as pos-
sible. The ability to make strategic decisions quickly and to implement them 
militarily and politically with great speed and agility sets Russia apart from 
the tsarist Empire or the USSR.
The strategic challenge for NATO remains its ability to reinforce the defence 
of the Baltic States. Russia’s strong air defence in vital hubs like Kaliningrad 
(as also deployed in Crimea) has created a state of affairs characterised by 
Russia’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Baltic region 
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(and in the Black Sea). These force NATO to consider prepositioning heavy 
materiel and increase the need for more persistent deployments of fight-
ing units in the Baltic States. A premium is also placed on NATO’s ability to 
provide reinforcements to the Baltic States, either via Poland’s narrow (112 
kilometre-wide) Suwalki corridor running between Kaliningrad and Bela-
rus, or by circumventing Kaliningrad, possibly via Sweden and Finland.
Along with the access to and defence of St. Petersburg, the “Northern Cap-
ital”, the Russian threat perception in the Northwest is primarily centred on 
protecting tous azimuts its nuclear deterrent and the Northern fleet on the 
coast of Murmansk, including the shipyards of Arkhangelsk and the mis-
sile launch centre in Plesetsk. Air defence is concentrated against a transpo-
lar threat. The Russian sea denial capability reaches far south into the Nor-
wegian Sea. Land protection is the task of the new Arctic brigade being 
formed in Alakurtti, south of Murmansk and close to the Finnish border.
For Russia, the loss of a strategic buffer after the Baltic States joined NATO 
has been remedied by a build-up of a strong denial capability (A2/AD) 
around Kaliningrad, while the new-found agility of its armed forces com-
pensates for reductions in the force structure, along with the new emphasis 
placed on nuclear weapons.
The return of nuclear weapons to the European theatre has caught the West 
by surprise. In a world where non-proliferation replaced nuclear disarma-
ment, the sudden re-discovery that nuclear weapons could be brandished for 
political or strategic gain, and possibly even be used, came as a shock. Rus-
sia has systematically upgraded its nuclear triad, as has the United States. The 
same applies to the nuclear deterrents of Britain and France. But the rest of 
Europe, especially Germany, but also Finland and Sweden, has all but forgot-
ten about nuclear strategy and its intricacies. The Russian investment in its 
nuclear deterrent remains its only claim to superpower status. Nuclear weap-
ons are nevertheless weapons and reminding the United States and NATO 
about its nuclear potential is part of Russia’s deterrence in the war in Ukraine. 
In the annexation of Crimea, Russia ostensibly made the point that any ter-
ritory passing under direct Russian control would ipso facto benefit from the 
extension of Russia’s nuclear umbrella. Russia attaches particular importance 
to short-range nuclear weapons, both as battlefield weapons countervailing 
conventional imbalances and as tools for exerting psychological and political 
pressure, as evidenced in a number of exercises in the Western Military Dis-
trict, sometimes in conjunction with Belarus.
14 I THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND’S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP • AN ASSESSMENT
The security and future of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is of vital signifi-
cance for Finland and Sweden. The Baltic States have experienced unprec-
edented growth in economic and human contacts over the Gulf of Finland 
and the Baltic Sea during their twenty-five years of freedom and regained 
independence, plus subsequent membership of the European Union and 
NATO. In joining the eurozone, the Baltic States submitted proof of their 
economic proficiency. It is of strategic significance for Finland and Sweden 
that the Southern coast of the Gulf of Finland and the Eastern coast of the 
Baltic Sea remain free. 
The war in Ukraine and Russia’s aggressive posture have unsettled the Baltic 
States. The deeply felt insecurity has stirred the debate in Finland and Swe-
den, too. NATO membership has not been debated with such seriousness 
in the two countries since the end of the Cold War. The likelihood that Rus-
sia would test NATO Article 5 in the Baltic States remains low, as this would 
trigger a response from the Alliance. Despite its proven ability to use military 
force and the prowess of its special operations forces and the capability to 
project power, Russian resources are stretched. The number of fighting forc-
es remains limited. However, Russia’s new-found strategic and military agili-
ty maximises the utility of these forces. As a consequence, NATO has taken a 
set of measures to reassure its most exposed members and to constrain Rus-
sia’s dynamic conduct, which also imposes on Russia’s neighbours a require-
ment for higher degrees of military readiness. Furthermore, the lack of stra-
tegic depth of the Baltic States and the great difficulty in providing timely 
reinforcements as a result of Kaliningrad’s A2AD capability mean that NATO 
could be forced to resort to the threat of nuclear escalation in the event of 
an attack against the Baltic States – as was largely the case for the defence 
of West Berlin during the Cold War. Such a situation is inherently dangerous. 
Russia has also acquired the ability to combine ambiguous or hybrid oper-
ations with the use of military means. It is therefore in both Finnish and 
Swedish interests that the security of the Baltic States is enhanced through 
adequate military means. In the light of the changed Russian posture and 
military activity, Sweden is re-building its territorial defence. The Finnish 
defence posture remains a policy of deterrence by denial. The unprecedent-
ed undertaking to jointly deepen Finnish and Swedish defence efforts is 
another result of the changed military environment. 
Russia has fourteen contiguous neighbours and remains the coun-
try with the longest land border in the world. Russia’s border with Fin-
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land and Norway has been the most stable and well managed of all. The 
Fenno-Soviet/Russian border regime has functioned flawlessly since the 
end of the 1950s and the numbers crossing it remain high. To the great 
surprise of Norway and Finland, in the autumn of 2015 Russia sudden-
ly allowed third country nationals without proper visas to cross over, 
first to Norway and, as of December 2015, to Finland at two north-
ern checkpoints. This called into question the long-established border 
regime while exacerbating the refugee problem. The sudden changes 
in the border regime look like yet another hybrid tool to convey mes-
sages. These ceased as suddenly as they began in late February 2016. A 
Russian-Finnish bilateral agreement was reached on 22 March 2016 to 
restrict, as an interim solution, the use of the two northern checkpoints 
to Finnish and Russian/Belarussian citizens only. 
2. From non-alignment towards collective  
security frameworks
The end of the Cold War strengthened aspirations for a system of cooper-
ative security. The CSCE was turned into an Organisation of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in 1994 with a joint value basis enshrined in the Paris 
Charter (1990). A comprehensive concept of security was embodied in the 
permanent institutions established for the organisation, such as the Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the High Commission-
er on National Minorities. These were meant to have some independent 
leeway in this strictly consensus-bound system. The OSCE was supposed to 
make security in Europe a common issue by preventing conflicts and estab-
lishing a permanent dialogue on issues of common interest. Its joint value 
basis aimed to consolidate respect for democracy and human rights in the 
post-Soviet states. 
The vision for cooperative security, however, faded away along with the 
strengthened Russian assertiveness and power politics. Russia currently 
challenges the legitimacy of the post-Cold War international order, the gov-
ernance of which (including the OSCE and the Council of Europe) it per-
ceives as embodiments of Western hegemony. The model of international 
order promoted by Russia – and reflected, for instance, in the proposal by 
the then President Dmitry Medvedev for a new Euro-Atlantic treaty system 
from 2008 – is based on the balance of power between the main actors 
consolidating their right to spheres of interest. 
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The Russian approach culminating in a violation of the basic norms and 
principles of the OSCE through the annexation of Crimea and military 
action in Eastern Ukraine has hampered the full-scale functioning of the 
organisation and challenged its future role. Added to this, the political 
development of Russia has led to a questioning of the concept of compre-
hensive security enshrined in the OSCE’s key values and principles and, in 
particular, its human dimension. 
Reflecting the general weakening of cooperative security in Europe, the 
arms control regime has also started to fall apart. As a result of this devel-
opment, all three pillars of European arms control – the Treaty on Conven-
tional Arms in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Vienna Document on Confidence- 
and Security-Building Measures (VD 2011) and the Open Skies Treaty have 
either become outdated or been abandoned. Even though Finland and Swe-
den do not take part in the CFE Treaty, they have still been working active-
ly within the framework of the Vienna Document. The inactivation of this 
system of norms and confidence-building measures has increased distrust. 
As a consequence of a deepening distrust between Russia and the West 
(and with it the weakened legitimacy of the structures of cooperative secu-
rity), political confrontation and military tension have increased. With the 
growing risk of military accidents and the escalation of military activities, 
the security of countries such as Finland located in the immediate vicinity 
of Russian strategic regions is becoming vulnerable. 
Cooperative security. NATO’s transformation in the 1990s broad-
ened its tasks from collective defence to crisis management and cooper-
ation with third countries. In this context, NATO changed its threat con-
ceptions and engaged in a special relationship with Russia. The Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) concept was launched in 1994 as a platform between NATO 
and non-member states to adjust cooperation to the very different starting 
levels of partner countries in terms of military capabilities. Finland joined at 
its creation and has also been a full ab initio participant in the PfP’s plan-
ning and review process (PARP) from 1995 onwards. 
Since the early years of cooperative security, 12 partners have become full 
members of NATO and currently the organisation’s more than 40 partners 
cover regions from North Africa and the Middle East to Asia. In the organ-
isation’s 13-year-long operation in Afghanistan, which was the largest and 
longest NATO operation ever, 22 partner countries took part. 
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NATO’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe was a demanding polit-
ical task which put its relationship with Russia to the test. Although the Rus-
sian leadership was never pleased with the continuing presence of NATO in 
the post-Cold War Europe – not to speak of its enlargement – Moscow’s 
reactions were political in nature, and did not lead to a strategic crisis or 
economic countermeasures. This was true for both the 1999 enlargement 
(Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) and even for the 2004 ‘Big Bang’ (Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia). Although 
the Russian leadership used harsh language and threatened to impose sanc-
tions if NATO expansion were to include the Baltic States, their accession 
did not cause any major worsening of their relationship with Russia.
However, Russia drew the line at Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO. 
Although US efforts to force the issue of membership at the 2008 NATO 
summit in Bucharest met with European resistance, which put the issue 
on indefinite hold, Russia was determined to use all means to remove the 
option from the table completely.  
This was in contrast to Russia’s prior conduct. Indeed, NATO concluded 
a PfP agreement with Russia in 1994 and Russia also participated in the 
NATO-led IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia in 1995, and subsequent-
ly in Kosovo as part of KFOR in 1999–2000. To conciliate Russia with 
respect to NATO enlargement, the two parties raised their relationship to 
a new level through a specific Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Coopera-
tion and Security concluded in 1997. It established a permanent joint coun-
cil with a coordination and consultation mechanism between Russia and 
NATO without, however, granting Russia a right to veto NATO decisions. 
The functioning of the permanent joint council was briefly suspended in 
spring 1999 due to disagreements over the Kosovo war but was resumed 
a couple of months later. The positive relations between the parties culmi-
nated in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the US in 2001, when 
the scope of cooperation was furthermore enlarged and a new NATO-Rus-
sia council was established to provide Russia with a more equal status in its 
cooperation with NATO (“at 29”). Russia duly served as a major logistical 
supply line for NATO-led forces in Afghanistan.
The full range of activities created in the framework of the NATO-Russia 
council did not, however, prevent the continued presence of NATO as part 
of Russia’s “enemy picture” (Feindbild), even in its successive post-Cold War 
military doctrines (1993, 2000, 2010, 2015). The Russian war against Geor-
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gia in 2008 led to the suspension of all political and military cooperation 
among the parties in this framework until the “reset” of US-Russian rela-
tions in 2009. After the annexation of Crimea (2014), cooperation was sus-
pended – and remains so.
NATO’s decision to focus back on collective defence (Article 5 tasks) was 
a direct consequence of the Russian take-over of Crimea and operation in 
the Donbass. In its Wales summit of 2014 the organisation adopted a new 
Readiness Action Plan to strengthen its collective defence. The plan includ-
ed a continuous military presence that went well beyond air policing, estab-
lished on a rotational basis in the eastern parts of the Alliance in the Bal-
tics and subsequently Iceland, introduced from 2004 onwards. A very high 
readiness joint task force (VJTF) deployable within a few days was estab-
lished. These initiatives together with an enlarged exercise programme 
were meant to consolidate NATO’s deterrence. 
NATO’s renewed emphasis on Article 5 tasks has created the perception in 
Finland of a growing distinction between its members and partners, as the 
latter do not have equal access to activities taking place in the framework 
of Article 5, such as contingency planning and force planning.
To balance the consequences of a reinforced focus on Article 5 tasks, NATO 
offered strengthened forms of cooperation for its partners on the initia-
tive of Finland and Sweden. The Enhanced Opportunities Partners (EOP) 
programme deepens NATO’s cooperation with its most interoperable part-
ners, including Finland and Sweden1. The programme created by the 2014 
NATO summit provides better possibilities for these partners to take part 
in NATO’s exercises and operations and strengthens their political dialogue 
with the Atlantic Alliance. In addition to this, better access to information 
and deepened cooperation in cyber defence have been among the Finnish 
priorities.
On issues relating more specifically to the Baltic Sea region, “28 (NATO) + 2 
(Finland & Sweden)” meetings are also held.
Finland’s ever closer NATO partnership. After the initial years of 
domestic controversies, Finland’s partnership with NATO has become a 
legitimate part of its security policy. This is commonly understood to be a 
policy of increasing cooperation with NATO without full membership. The 
1  As well as Australia, Georgia and Jordan.
THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND’S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP • AN ASSESSMENT I 19
stated policy remains not to forsake the possibility to apply for member-
ship2. The political significance of the NATO partnership has been further 
strengthened due to the growing tension in Northern Europe and the slow 
progress of the EU’s common security and defence policy. 
As a part of Finland’s security policy, the NATO partnership clearly has a polit-
ical and military function. The military part revolves around enhancing inter-
operability with NATO forces, where significant steps have been taken since 
1995 when Finland began to participate in the PfP’s Planning and Review Pro-
cess (PARP). Finland has chosen a broad range of partnership goals and they 
currently cover the whole development programme of the Finnish Defence 
Forces. Interoperability created in NATO’s framework also supports military 
cooperation in the EU and NORDEFCO frameworks. According to NATO’s 
assessments, Finland currently reaches an overall high level of interoperability.
Interoperability is tested in practice in those military exercises that are open 
to partner countries as well as in NATO-led crisis management operations, 
which have formed the political core of Finland’s partnership. To signal 
this, on occasion Finland’s contribution to NATO-led operations reached a 
numerically higher level than its contribution to other multilateral operations. 
This activity started along with NATO’s IFOR and SFOR operations in Bos-
nia, where Finland sent a construction battalion from 1996 onwards. To be 
able to do this, Finland’s legislation on international peace-keeping, howev-
er, had to undergo a number of principled changes as it did not allow partici-
pation in operations led by actors other than the UN and OSCE. Further, the 
mandate for the use of force in international operations had to be extend-
ed in this context. The Finnish contribution to the initial KFOR operation in 
Kosovo in 1999 reached some 800 soldiers whereas in ISAF, Afghanistan, its 
role remained at the company level. Another major step with the partnership 
was taken through participation in NATO’s Response Force (NRF), which has 
contained units from all the military branches and joint exercises.
The future of the PfP programme has been unclear ever since the major group 
of partners joined NATO. The most recent developments indicate NATO’s 
willingness to provide its most advanced partners with a special status which, 
to some extent, blurs the distinction between members and partners.
Irrespective of this, the Atlantic Alliance makes it clear that the organi-
sation’s security guarantees apply to members only. Full access to collec-
2  Cf. Government programme, spring 2015.
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tive defence planning, decision-making and military structures can only be 
reached via full membership. This leads to the main paradox of the NATO 
partnership, namely that in the worst case it can be seen in the eyes of 
external actors to strengthen an ever-closer association with NATO with-
out, however, supplying the deterrence provided by Article 5.
Finland, in effect, belongs today to the inner circle of the NATO partnership. 
With the exception of air surveillance and control (see Chapter III below), 
Finland is close to the limit of what a non-member can achieve with NATO. 
In the event of NATO membership, Finland’s territorial defence would be 
coherent with the Article 5 defence of the country.
The relationship between the EU and NATO. During the last few years 
a number of issues have pushed the relationship between the EU and NATO 
towards complementarity instead of rivalry. The way the political and mil-
itary relationship between these two organisations is arranged is of crucial 
importance for Finland as it is a member of one but not of the other.
A change in the US view on the EU common security and defence poli-
cy (CSDP) has paved the way for complementarity being pursued between 
the EU and NATO. Since its inception in 1999 and notwithstanding its lack 
of progress in recent years, the CSDP has been perceived as an important 
framework for a stronger European military contribution to the transatlan-
tic relationship. Although existing political and economic conditions pre-
clude any large-scale functional overlap between the two organisations, the 
EU has been able to enter into fields such as the mutual defence and sol-
idarity clauses. The fact remains, at least in the short and medium term, 
that the military structures and preparedness that exist in NATO will not be 
built within the EU.
Finland’s (and Sweden’s) possible membership of NATO would increase the 
overlap of membership between the EU’s and NATO’s respective mem-
bership3 But this would not significantly change the existing relationship 
between NATO and the EU. The situation would change basically only if a 
stable modus vivendi were established between NATO and the EU in terms 
of the exchange of classified information. Lack of agreement on this issue 
impairs even the most basic and pragmatic cooperation between NATO 
and the CSDP as envisioned in the 1999 ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement. Any pro-
3  22 out of 28 EU members belong to NATO and vice versa. The non-NATO countries of the EU are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and 
Sweden.
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gress here is, in turn, dependent on the resolution of the Cyprus question, 
which in turn is inextricably linked with Turkey-EU relations: Turkey, as a 
member of NATO, has been withholding the effective implementation of 
the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement.
The EU as an uncertain collective security and defence frame-
work. The EU, however, is moving on with its common defence and secu-
rity policy, which will be seen to complement and support the other fields 
of cooperation within the EU. This currently takes place within three major 
political processes, which will affect the EU’s position in the overall Europe-
an security policy architecture, and its relationship with NATO accordingly.
The first is the ongoing drafting of the EU Global Strategy for the Union’s 
foreign and security policy, which may be followed this time by a set of 
action plans and possible White Papers that will ensure a better transfor-
mation of the strategic guidelines into joint preparedness and capabilities 
in security and defence policy. If the process reaches its goal, the EU’s key 
security political needs should be supported with more focused planning 
and capabilities.
The second process of significant political importance relates to the con-
struction of a European defence technological and industrial base. This is 
a Commission-driven project which aims to enhance the competitiveness 
of the European defence industry among other things through the exten-
sion of the single market to defence, and by establishing a funding instru-
ment for defence- related research in the EU budget above and beyond the 
existing European Security Research Programme (ESRP). If it comes to fru-
ition, this project could strengthen the ties between European defence pol-
icy and the Union’s general economic and industrial policies, and foster a 
more coordinated view among the member states about the needs in terms 
of defence capabilities.
The third process relates to the specification of the commitments for mutu-
al assistance within the EU which have gained more relevance due to the 
changing political environment and a set of more multifaceted threats. The 
provisions of the solidarity clause (TEU, Art. 222), which includes the use 
of the EU’s instruments in the case of terrorist attacks or natural/manmade 
catastrophes, have already been complemented with rules concerning its 
implementation. The mutual defence clause (TEU, Art. 42.7), which direct-
ly relates to cases of armed aggression, has gained more political impor-
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tance since its implementation in the context of the Paris terrorist attacks 
in November 2015.
Despite the importance of the ongoing processes, the EU will, for an indef-
inite period of time, remain far from NATO in terms of its hard security 
capacities. The strengthened military tension in Europe stresses this rela-
tionship further. The Union’s command structure is tiny in comparison with 
NATO and its key foci in terms of planning and capabilities lie in tasks oth-
er than collective defence. With a significant number of EU members also 
being members of NATO, the Union’s role has been to attempt to advance 
European security through its comprehensive political and economic tools, 
rather than by operating primarily with military instruments.
In this respect, the EU’s mutual defence clause (TEU, Art. 42.7) has a dif-
ferent character, as it deals with hard security and obligates all EU mem-
bers to defend an EU country in the event of armed aggression. The firm 
obligation is softened by its character as an obligation between the mem-
ber states. As defence of a member state in such a situation is not conferred 
to the EU (as distinct from the solidarity clause, TEU, Art. 222) but to the 
partner states, the clause does not give rise to joint systems of planning 
and command. Any arrangements on aid and assistance will in these condi-
tions remain on a bilateral basis between the targeted country and the oth-
ers. The activation of the clause at the request of France after the terrorist 
attacks in November 2015, however, is likely to make it a living part of the 
EU and to lower the threshold for its use.
All in all, irrespective of their largely overlapping memberships and mili-
tary resources, NATO and the EU will remain separate actors in the field of 
European hard security. Existing structures and cooperation allow the EU, 
and its member states, to respond to a wide range of low-intensity conflicts 
without NATO. When it comes to major military conflicts of a tradition-
al or non-traditional character, it is still NATO with its military and political 
assets that would be the prime mover, and whose credibility would imme-
diately be at stake in an Article 5 contingency.
On the other hand, it is equally unthinkable that the EU mutual defence 
clause would not become activated in a major European conflict. The 
main result of its activation together with NATO’s defence clause would 
concern the involvement of the EU’s six non-NATO countries (in particu-
lar Finland and Sweden) in the conflict. Their participation would require 
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a political decision taken by them and, in principle, would take place out-
side NATO structures on a bilateral basis. It is obvious that experiences 
gained from NATO partnership activities would be relevant in organising 
their contribution. It is, however, NATO’s contingency planning and com-
mand structure that would play the leading role: by definition, non-mem-
bers of NATO will not have been part of the corresponding planning 
preparations.
One further observation concerning the relationship between the EU and 
NATO concerns the way in which they are perceived by external actors 
such as Russia. Even as its attitude towards NATO became harsher over 
the years, Russia’s perception of the EU’s role as an actor in security and 
defence policy remained nonchalant. The situation, however, changed 
fundamentally during the run-up to the confrontation in Ukraine. Since 
then, the roles of NATO and the EU are hardly distinguishable as a part 
of the Russian enemy picture. In Russia’s December 2015 National Secu-
rity Strategy, NATO and the EU are presented as companion parts of the 
West, with NATO and the United States at the forefront. Russia sees EU 
membership (or even associate status with the EU) as leading inexora-
bly to NATO membership: it is this view which informed Russia’s policy in 
Ukraine from 2013 onwards. 
Considerations of the EU as a security and defence framework remain in a 
state of flux. Uncertainty about the United Kingdom’s membership of the 
EU, the stresses placed on the Schengen regime, the difficulties in securing 
a resolution to the Cyprus problem, and the redefinition of EU-Turkey rela-
tions are all at play at the time of writing, and each one can have a signifi-
cant effect on the future of the EU as a security and defence actor. The fact 
remains that EU membership and its implications in the field of security and 
defence have led, after due political deliberation, to the end of non-align-
ment as Finland’s policy of choice in 2007. 
Finland’s policy within the CSDP. Security policy considerations played a 
key role in Finland’s decision to join the EU, and to do so with no legal or de 
facto opt-outs. Therefore, a functional and credible CSDP has always been of 
the utmost importance to the country. Finland has been in favour of deepen-
ing the CSDP, while putting the emphasis on concrete issues such as the devel-
opment of common capabilities and better use of the Union’s comprehensive 
toolbox and civil-military cooperation. Finland has contributed to most EU-led 
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civil and military operations. It also provides troops to the roster of EU Battle 
Groups. These have not been used since their creation in 2006, however.
The EU’s mutual defence clause (TEU, Art. 42.7) has had important conse-
quences for Finland’s policies and legislation. The adoption of the clause led 
to the abandonment of non-alignment as Finland’s security policy. The cor-
responding legislative changes are currently being discussed, which would 
provide the legal framework for the reception and provision of internation-
al assistance, above and beyond the current legislation on crisis manage-
ment and its provisions concerning the enlarged use of force. The mutual 
defence clause has been the driving force for these changes but their scope 
is of a much broader nature, since they also apply to non-EU contingen-
cies as long as they are in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter. 
They would be of direct relevance to Finland’s Bündnisfähigkeit, its ability to 
play its full role as an ally, if the country were to join NATO.  
Nordic cooperation in security and defence policy: how much can 
it achieve? Nordic defence cooperation has had a pragmatic image since 
the Cold War. Differing positions towards the EU and NATO create obvious 
constraints for deeper security and defence policy cooperation between the 
Nordic states. Cooperation, therefore, has focused on crisis management, 
training and exercises, and armaments cooperation.
The Finnish and Swedish partnerships with NATO, and the Norwegian 
engagement in the EU’s crisis management policy, have provided larger 
frameworks for Nordic defence cooperation and platforms for the use of 
joint Nordic capabilities. 
A couple of recent efforts have been made that go beyond the pragmat-
ic character of cooperation, however. First came the so-called Swedish sol-
idarity declaration of 2009. Confirming its commitment to the EU’s mil-
itary assistance and solidarity clauses, Sweden extended its scope to the 
two Nordic states (Iceland and Norway) outside the EU. Later on, a similar 
declaration between the Nordic states was adopted in a ministerial meet-
ing in 2011, focusing on cybersecurity, terrorist attacks and natural or man-
made disasters. This Nordic Declaration stated that the intensified cooper-
ation would be undertaken wholly in line with each country’s security and 
defence policy, and would complement existing European and Euro-Atlan-
tic cooperation.
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The latter part of the declaration again serves as a reminder of the natu-
ral limits of defence cooperation between the Nordic states. Joint prepar-
edness or planning to fully implement the solidarity clause in a collective 
defence setting will be hindered as long as the Nordic states have different 
positions with respect to NATO.
Finland and Sweden have deepened defence cooperation. Differences in the 
political climate of the two countries, including the issue of possible NATO 
membership, has not impaired this cooperation. In the Nordic context, 
the difference in status between NATO members (Denmark, Iceland and 
Norway) and non-NATO members (Finland and Sweden) has not in itself 
prevented deepening of cooperation, and the same could apply if Sweden 
and Finland made a different choice with regard to NATO membership. 
But there are clear limits further down the road: a true collective defence 
alliance between the two countries – including integrated capabilities and 
a mutual defence clause with joint structures and planning – would force 
them to adopt an identical position towards NATO membership as long as 
the bilateral union were in force.
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CHAPTER III.  
THE MEANING OF MEMBERSHIP
«NATO Membership» is not as straightforward a proposition as it may 
appear at first blush. Historically, legally and practically, the Alliance came 
about in two distinct parts. First came the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 
4 April 1949 by the twelve founding members, which entered into force on 
24 August of that year. Since then, sixteen additional states have signed and 
ratified the Treaty. None of the parties to the Treaty has chosen to renounce 
it since it has been in existence. 
The creation of a military organisation was not a treaty commitment, nor 
had it been planned for ab initio. The move from a legally-binding politi-
cal association of nations to a broad-spectrum politico-military organisa-
tion came about as a result of the sharp rise in international tension caused 
by the Korean War ( June 1950–July 1953). The decision to study the estab-
lishment of a centralised command structure was taken in September 
1950, followed in December by the designation of General Eisenhower as 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The basic military struc-
tures for the Alliance in Europe and the political decision-making machin-
ery, with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) at its centre, were in place by 
mid-1951, and the entity has been known since then as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation.4 
France chose, from 1966 to 2009, to withdraw from the military part 
of NATO for the most part, removing all of its forces from the integrat-
ed command structure, while remaining a party to the Treaty and repre-
sented on the NAC as well as in a number of technical bodies. As a bud-
ding nuclear power located in a crucial geographical position, France could 
retain this policy despite the reluctance of her NATO allies. This is not on 
offer to putative new members of NATO: membership means both becom-
ing a party to the Treaty and a full participant in the organisation.
4  It may be worth noting that before NATO was set up, the five founding states of the Western European Union (the UK, France and Benelux) 
had established a command structure, the Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO), from 1948 to 1951 headed by Field Marshall Montgom-
ery in Fontainebleau, which eventually became NATO’s SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe).
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Greece withdrew from NATO’s integrated military structure from 1974 to 
1980, in the aftermath of the invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974 by fellow 
member state Turkey.
Another country, Spain, joined the Treaty and the political organs of NATO 
in 1982, but did not become a full participant in the command structure 
until 1999. However, a tight and long-standing bilateral military treaty with 
the US made this posture acceptable to NATO, while Spain’s geographical 
location made it an unlikely candidate for an armed attack from the out-
side. Finland’s geostrategic situation is different.
1. NATO’s basic purpose
THE TREATY. The basic Treaty commitment is clear: the parties “unite 
their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and 
security” (preamble). These two goals are materialised in the correspond-
ing operative Articles around which the others tend to revolve.
Article 5 states “that an armed attack against one…in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against…all”, adding that assistance 
to the attacked taken “individually and in concert with the other Parties” 
can include “the use of armed force”. 
The wording is unambiguous in the ‘all for one, one for all’ aspect. It is 
less clear on the mandatory nature of the assistance proffered: the word-
ing adopted was aimed at avoiding an isolationist reaction in the US Sen-
ate during the ratification debate. It can be argued that other treaty com-
mitments are more straightforward, such as the 1954 Brussels Treaty 
between the Western European states (“…the Parties will…afford the Par-
ty so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”) 
or the more recent Lisbon Treaty of European Union, in Article 42.7: “If a 
Member State is the victim of an armed aggression on its territory, the oth-
er Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance 
by all means in their power”. Finland is naturally bound by this commit-
ment, which sets a distinct precedent vis-à-vis its previous policies of neu-
trality and non-alignment.
What makes the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 uniquely powerful in compari-
son to the examples that have been cited is the United States’ membership of 
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the organisation, along with its unrivalled military capabilities and superpow-
er reach on the one hand, and the existence of the political and military deci-
sion-making structure and process embodied in NATO on the other. It is this 
combination which makes NATO profoundly different in the field of security 
and defence from the European Union, notwithstanding the fact that 22 EU 
members out of 28 are members of NATO (and vice versa).
It was noted in the previous assessment on the “Effects of Finland’s Possible 
NATO Membership” (21 December 2007) that “NATO’s original task, pre-
vention of an attack from outside, is no longer as central…as it used to be. 
Within NATO, it is estimated that, in the next ten years at least, the Alliance 
will not face such a military threat which it would not be able to respond 
to”. This is no longer the case on both counts: Article 5 is back at the cen-
tre of the Alliance’s concerns, and new measures were taken at the NATO 
Summit in Wales (2014) or are under active consideration to enable the Alli-
ance to credibly meet developing military threats, notably in the Baltic and 
on NATO’s Eastern border. The NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 will 
develop these measures further.
On the initiative of European members of NATO, Article 5 was invoked in 
the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States.
Article 4 may be less well known to the broader public but is of substan-
tial practical consequence. “The Parties will consult together whenever, in 
the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence 
or security of any of the Parties is threatened”: this instrument can thus 
be invoked by any member, and on occasion this is what happens in prac-
tice. Lithuania and Poland did so in 2014 in the face of Russian operations in 
Crimea, and Turkey has done so three times in recent years (in 2003 during 
the run-up to the US invasion of Iraq, in 2012 when a Turkish combat aircraft 
was shot down by Syria, and in 2015 during the siege of Kobane on the Turk-
ish-Syrian border). In itself, Article 4 is fundamentally no different from other 
consultative instruments, in the UN or EU frameworks for instance. As it can 
represent a step on the ladder to Article 5, it has a quality of its own, however. 
This also helps explain why it is invoked relatively rarely: most member states 
usually understand that this instrument must not be abused. 
THE ORGANISATION. If one strips away what NATO has in common with 
other treaty organisations relevant to Europe, four elements stand out. 
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First, the existence of an integrated command structure, which gives the 
parties to the Treaty the authority to operate collectively in military terms 
with greater efficiency and promptness than would otherwise be the case, 
whether acting in the framework of Article 5 or not. This can be extend-
ed to include non-NATO members, as has been the case in Bosnia, Kosovo 
(with inter alia, Russian troops operating as part of NATO’s KFOR in 1999-
2000) or Afghanistan (ISAF)). But this naturally does not readily apply to 
Article 5 contingencies, particularly those implying extremely short time-
lines such as NATO’s new VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force). 
By the same token, NATO’s key Defence Policy and Planning Committee 
(DPPC) is off limits to non-members.
Second, a NATO-specific infrastructure, including integrated air sur-
veillance and air defence (notably NATO AWACS) and logistical networks. 
When France left the integrated command structure in 1966, it continued 
despite some caveats to be a full partner in the NATO air surveillance sys-
tem and in the military pipeline organisation. These are highly integrated 
assets which imply an Article 5 commitment. They are essential to collective 
defence, whether as a part of deterrence or for the conduct of operations.
Third, despite their lack of prominence in post-Cold War NATO discourse, 
nuclear weapons remain an underpinning of NATO’s deterrence, with 
their ability to counter escalatory moves by a Russia which has in recent 
years placed increasing importance on its nuclear arsenal (see Chapter II). 
NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg issued a strong reminder on this 
score at the February 2016 Munich Security Conference.
This nuclear role includes the nuclear forces of Britain and France, which are 
considered to be “contributing to the overall strengthening of the Alliance” 
(Ottawa Declaration of NAC in ministerial session, 19 June 1974). Nuclear 
weapons also contribute to overall deterrence by ensuring strategic coupling 
between the United States and Europe: American air-delivered non-strate-
gic nuclear weapons are stationed in five European countries, under so-called 
“double key” arrangements. These weapons (B61 bombs) are currently the 
object of a life-extension programme ensuring their long-term effectiveness. 
This programme (B61-12 LEP) is expected to come to a conclusion by 2021 at 
an overall cost of some $958 million to the American taxpayer. 
US forces thus operate alongside European forces in Europe at all levels of 
the escalatory ladder. 
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Fourth, and of everyday practical utility, NATO is the framework in which 
standards and norms are developed to enable the technical and procedur-
al interoperability of Western forces at all levels of military activity, including 
those of a significant number of non-NATO partners. Without such inter-
operability, coalitions of the willing such as ISAF in Afghanistan would have 
been substantially more difficult to assemble and run. Full NATO member-
ship is not a prerequisite for participation in this field, but it is the existence 
of NATO’s integrated command structure which makes it possible to pro-
duce this public good on a large scale and at all levels. Finland is already deep-
ly engaged in a multifaceted policy conducive to interoperability, directly with 
and indeed within NATO (e.g. ISAF in Afghanistan) and with NATO mem-
bers, or indirectly via cooperation with Sweden, itself an evidently bündnis-
fähig country. Indeed, there is a widespread sense in NATO that Finland is 
close to the limit that it can reach without being a full member.
In practice, the pace-setter of the production of standards will tend to be 
the Alliance’s most powerful member, the US, with some 70% of NATO’s 
overall defence spending. However, in a multilateral setting such as NATO, 
the US cannot purely and simply impose its technical and operational 
norms, in contrast to what tends to occur when the US operates a hub-and-
spokes system5 as with its allies in Asia-Pacific (South Korea, Japan, Austral-
ia, New Zealand…): they and other non-NATO partners, which have been 
engaged in a long-standing direct defence-industrial relationship with the 
US, can end up being cramped into American-first choices.
WHAT NATO IS NOT. As the previous lines suggest, NATO essentially owes 
its depth and credibility to full US engagement in every facet of its activities, 
but it is not a mere extension of US power. It is a rare anomaly in the histo-
ry of international affairs: a largely sui generis multilateral defence alliance. 
This is in keeping with its historical origin. The Washington Treaty was the 
consequence not of American pressure but of the British and French quest 
for security reassurance once Stalin’s USSR had decided to treat the Marshall 
Plan as a strategic challenge, with the creation of the Kominform in late 
1947. The establishment of NATO as a military structure was the product 
of the overall Western fear of a new World War after the invasion of South 
Korea. The Western Europeans’ attempt to create a “European army” (The 
5  A hub-and-spokes system refers to the US as a ‘hub’ with no apparent connections between the ‘spokes’, i.e. with the countries with which it 
has a bilateral alliance, which enhances the dominant role played by the US.
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European Defence Community) as an integral part of NATO under SACEUR 
failed not because of non-existent US rejection, but because France refused 
to ratify the corresponding treaty in 1954. 
In the post-Cold War era, strong British and French pressure was required to 
help convince the Clinton administration to accept the forceful intervention 
of NATO in Bosnia after the Srebrenica massacre. NATO’s war in Kosovo was 
the result of a joint US and Western European initiative. It was the Europeans 
not the Americans who took the lead in invoking Article 5 for the first time 
and in America’s favour after the attacks of 11 September 2001: the US pref-
erence was to use its Florida-based Central Command (CENTCOM) as the 
vehicle for the overthrow of the Taliban. ISAF became a NATO operation only 
20 months after its creation in Afghanistan. US pressure did not succeed in 
securing NATO political endorsement of the planned invasion of Iraq, nor did 
it convince Turkey to allow the passage of US troops through its territory to 
Iraq. In the Libyan air campaign of 2011, France and the UK, not the US, were 
the prime movers once the operations had been handed over to NATO. 
These and other examples tend to demonstrate that NATO is not a US 
“tool”; it often provides a vehicle to influence the US and it constrains rath-
er than enhances US unilateralist inclinations.
US influence, as opposed to direct pressure, can and does have effects on 
national choices within NATO: during the years of NATO counter-insurgen-
cy operations in Afghanistan, the Baltic States ratcheted back on their ter-
ritorial defence to make way for expeditionary forces. Their border guards, 
initially built on the Finnish model, and with Finnish help, were turned into 
a police force. But this in itself does not make NATO America’s tool. It is 
also worth noting that forces from the Baltic States gained valuable com-
bat experience in Afghanistan: this is arguably facilitating the re-building of 
a credible territorial defence in Estonia, for instance.
Sweden’s decision to dismantle its territorial defence a few years ago was 
taken independently of NATO.
Nor is NATO a war machine that can be activated as a result of pressures 
from within the organisation. With the exception of assets such as those 
described above (air defence, logistics…), NATO does not “own” its own 
troops. The NRF, in which Finland is a participant, is composed of troops 
belonging to the member states. Even the VJTF, which will ‘belong’ to 
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SACEUR in military terms, will ultimately only be deployable at the rate of 
the slowest of the political authorisation processes of the countries involved. 
Indeed, this has been the case for previous forces assigned to SACEUR, such 
as the Cold War-era Allied Mobile Force (AMF): when SACEUR attempt-
ed to move its air component on his own initiative to protect Turkey dur-
ing the 1991 Gulf War, countries whose aircraft and aircrew were part of the 
AMF withheld authorisation (Belgium and Germany).6 
If Article 5 is based on the principle of ‘all for one, one for all’, the same 
does not hold true for non-Article 5 combat operations: Greece did not 
participate in the Kosovo air campaign; fully half of NATO’s (and the EU’s) 
members, including major countries such as Germany and Poland, did not 
support the Libya campaign in 2011 and only nine out of 28 actually partic-
ipated in the operations, in which a number of non-NATO countries (Swe-
den, United Arab Emirates, Qatar…) were also present. 
In other words, NATO decision-making allows for substantial flexibility, as 
a somewhat paradoxical result of the rule of consensus. Since substantive 
decisions are not taken by a straight for-or-against vote (as is the case in the 
EU), those who don’t want to participate in a given non-Article 5 initiative 
simply opt out, without preventing others from moving forward. There are 
necessarily limits to this flexibility, but as the Libyan case indicates, they are 
very broad indeed.
2. Full membership options
For the purpose of this assessment, we have discarded the “Gaullist option” 
(membership with Article 5 but placed outside of NATO’s military force 
structure and defence planning machinery), for the reasons indicated above: 
it is not on offer. Any membership will be full membership.
However, this does not mean that there is only one way of being a full 
member with only one set of possible effects. Similarly, the effects of mem-
bership will vary as a function of the choices of other partners: a more or 
6  An extreme case occurred at the end of the Kosovo campaign, a non-Article 5 contingency, in June 1999. British General Sir Michael Jackson, 
as commander of NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps, refused to obey an order given by American General Wesley Clark acting as SACEUR, to prevent 
the reinforcement of the Russian force at Pristina air base. General Jackson reminded his superior that such a political decision had to be approved 
by his government; he allegedly added that “I’m not going to start the third world war for your sake”. Mike Jackson’s career did not suffer as a 
result; Wes Clark lost his job as SACEUR earlier than he expected. 
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less joint entry by Finland and Sweden will not generate the same conse-
quences as a stand-alone decision by either country to become a mem-
ber. Several templates will therefore be mentioned here, while some of their 
specific effects will be explained in greater detail in Chapter IV.
FULL MEMBERSHIP FOR BOTH FINLAND AND SWEDEN. This will be 
our baseline for assessing effects but it has variations, since Finland would 
have the possibility of choosing between different postures. One option 
is to adhere to what is absolutely required to be a full member but noth-
ing beyond that requirement: this would be akin to Norway’s self-im-
posed restrictions, with no nuclear weapons, no foreign bases, and “non 
provocative” defence of Finnmark, with limited allied military activity east-
ward of 24° East longitude. Another is to choose to add on other features 
to its membership, as is the case today for Poland and the Baltic States, 
for instance, which are requesting a permanent foreign NATO presence on 
their territory. In the case of Germany, the non-deployment of foreign forc-
es and nuclear weapons on the territory of the former German Democrat-
ic Republic is based on the “2+4” treaty (1990), which set the terms of Ger-
man reunification. Conversely, NATO’s decision not to proceed with such 
deployments on the territory of NATO’s post-Cold War members in Cen-
tral Europe is of a political nature. 
A special treaty regime also applies to the Norwegian Svalbard Islands: Arti-
cle 9 of the Paris Treaty (1920) prohibits naval bases and fortifications and 
the use of the islands for warlike purposes. The treaty includes 41 parties, 
and has been ratified by the US, Russia, China, France, the UK, Germany 
and all of the Scandinavian states. 
The Faroe Islands, an autonomous territory exercising home rule within the 
Kingdom of Denmark are part of NATO. The same applies to Greenland.7
If Finland and Sweden were both to join NATO, their specific posture could 
differ, as is already the case for EU membership, with both countries in the 
EU but with Sweden outside of the single currency.
7  Neither of these territories is part of the EU, nor do they belong to the Schengen area.
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FINLAND IN, SWEDEN OUT. Although this appears an unlikely option, 
it is not impossible. It would generate substantially different effects than 
the baseline scenario for both Finland and NATO. The conditions under 
which Article 5 would be implemented would be more complex for geo-
graphical reasons than in the joint membership hypothesis and would 
probably be less appealing for NATO in terms of facilitating the defence 
of the Baltic States.
FINLAND OUT, SWEDEN IN. Although this possibility lies outside of a 
strict interpretation of our Terms of Reference, it calls for some consider-
ation given its degree of likelihood. It may also have some attractiveness 
viewed from a logistical and operational NATO perspective, despite the 
potential for adverse effects for Finland. The membership of Sweden would 
greatly facilitate the circumvention of Russian Anti-Access Area Deni-
al (A2AD) assets in Kaliningrad threatening NATO forces en route to the 
Baltic States. Given the military geography of the region, Article 5 defence 
of Sweden would also represent little stress for NATO compared to oth-
er recent members, notwithstanding the dismantling of territorial defence. 
Sweden’s military and defence-industrial cooperation with the US since the 
late 1950s, its American defence guarantee, and its relationship with NATO 
during the Cold War would give its possible membership of NATO a natural 
quality in the eyes of many observers.
THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND’S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP • AN ASSESSMENT I 35
CHAPTER IV.  
THE EFFECTS OF FULL NATO 
MEMBERSHIP
The effects of Finland’s possible membership will be dealt with on the basis 
of what mathematicians call: “the problem is considered to have been as 
resolved”, i.e. Finland has joined NATO, without prejudging whether this 
will, or should, happen. Therefore, we will avoid a balance-sheet type of pres-
entation of liabilities and assets, of pros and cons. Conversely, some of the 
effects will be heavily scenario-dependent, notably in terms of the existence 
or absence of a more or less joint approach between Finland and Sweden.
Since NATO’s raison d’être is to provide collective defence, the defence and 
military effects will be examined first, followed by an assessment of the 
strategic and political consequences. 
1. Getting from here to there
Before detailing these effects, it must be noted that the pace of possible 
accession can have effects of its own. Membership processes can be more 
or less prolonged, depending on the state of political decision-making in the 
accession country and on the view existing NATO countries have as to the 
desirability of, and its readiness for, full membership. The entry of post-com-
munist states was relatively slow both because of the preference for grouped 
memberships (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, in 1999; then the “Big 
Bang” of 2004 with seven entrants including the Baltic States) and the intrin-
sic difficulty of making these former Warsaw Pact countries NATO-compat-
ible. But time was not of the essence during this strategically benign period. 
Nor are other post-communist states such as Albania, Croatia and currently 
Montenegro models for Finland in terms of meeting NATO standards. 
The accession process that is possibly the most comparable to Finland or 
Sweden in terms of the internal political dynamics may be that of Spain. 
Not unlike Finland (and Sweden), the population of Spain was divided on 
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the issue of membership, largely along party lines. Despite Spain’s joining 
the Atlantic Alliance in 1982, there was widespread disagreement and the 
implementation of its full participation was put on hold. The matter was 
put to a referendum in 1986, with 52.5% voting in favour, notwithstanding 
the backdrop of negative opinion polls. The pace of accession was clearly 
dictated by the political decision-making process not by technical obstacles. 
Time was not of the essence.
Finland is in a more exposed location and for legitimate political reasons 
a hypothetical accession process may be long. The transition period from 
the current security regime to possible NATO membership would have to 
be the object of careful diplomatic and political preparation (see section 
4 below). The need for advance preparation by Finland with its Western 
partners in case of accession, notably in terms of handling possible Russian 
reactions, has been a recurrent theme in many of our meetings.
2. Defence and military implications for NATO
Finland’s possible membership of NATO has strategic and military con-
sequences for NATO as well as for Finland. The effects for NATO will be 
examined first, since NATO’s response to a possible membership request 
by Finland will depend to a large extent on these effects. Furthermore, 
NATO’s ability to fulfil its treaty tasks vis-à-vis Finland as a member is of 
great potential importance for Finland.
COMMAND STRUCTURE. Unlike the situation during and after the Cold 
War, NATO’s command structure is no longer principally organised around 
territorial commands having responsibility for specific geographical are-
as. Its organisation is built along mainly functional lines, with operations 
(ACO, Allied Command Operations) in Mons (Belgium) under SACEUR on 
the one hand, and transformation based in Norfolk (Virginia) under ACT 
(Allied Command Transformation). Under ACO come land (LANDCOM, 
in Izmir, Turkey), air (AIRCOM, Ramstein, Germany), and maritime (MAR-
COM, Northwood, United Kingdom) commands and two joint forces com-
mands ( JFC) respectively in Brunssum (the Netherlands) and Naples (Italy). 
It is at this joint forces level that one can find a broad North-South division. 
Bringing Finland into this overall command structure should not pose sig-
nificant difficulties for NATO, whether Finland joins alone or with Sweden 
as part of NATO’s North-East European theatre of operations.
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The experience of NATO’s newly created Force Integration Units (NFIUS) 
in the Baltic States and Poland may also be of relevance to Finland.
INFRASTRUCTURE. For NATO, the full integration of Finland’s air defence 
assets would be a substantial improvement on the current situation. Today, 
there is some transparency between NATO’s air situation and defence and 
Finland’s assets (notably the Air Situational Data Exchange, ASDE): this is 
necessary for air traffic management and safety reasons. However, the shar-
ing of the regional air picture is partial in nature and incomplete in geo-
graphical scope when compared to what it would be in a full NATO frame-
work. This applies both to air situation data in the airspace of Finland and 
its NATO or EU partners, as well as to the Russian airspace contiguous to 
Finland. The same remarks apply to Sweden’s limited sharing of air situa-
tion data with both NATO and Finland.
Technically and operationally, the integration of existing and planned NATO 
and Finnish air surveillance assets would be a straightforward task, with Fin-
land joining NATO’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS). Finland has 
the corresponding technological know-how and experience of cooperation 
with industrial partners involved in ACCS.
It is unclear whether Finland (and/or Sweden) could acquire ACCS with-
out full membership of NATO. However, it could presumably secure a lev-
el of interoperability with ACCS comparable to that of neutral Switzerland’s 
FLORAKO air surveillance and control system. In the meantime, Finland’s 
and Sweden’s ability to share a detailed picture of the air situation between 
themselves and with NATO partners remains limited.
Conversely, logistical infrastructure issues would be largely scenario-de-
pendent. From NATO’s standpoint, a joint entry by Finland and Sweden 
(or indeed by Sweden alone) would be convenient in the sense that circum-
vention of Kaliningrad’s A2AD and support for the defence of the Baltic 
States would presumably transit via Sweden. The situation would be differ-
ent were Finland to join alone: in that case, planning for the defence of the 
Baltic States would call on access to Finnish land, airspace and territorial 
waters. 
FORCE POSTURE AND PLANNING. If one assumes that Russian force 
dispositions and activities remain more or less what they are today, Fin-
land’s current and planned (see below) force posture should be militari-
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ly adequate from a NATO standpoint. Finland’s territorial defence is supe-
rior to that of the smaller Baltic States. This would be true whether Finland 
joins alone or with Sweden. Foreign military bases, let alone the stationing 
of nuclear weapons, would not be a prerequisite for the effective extension 
of NATO’s defence guarantee.
However, Russia may reinforce its forces in the former Leningrad Military 
District, notably in the Murmansk oblast and on the Karelian Isthmus, 
either in response to Finland and/or Sweden joining NATO, or independent-
ly of such an eventuality. Russia’s current deployment of an infantry brigade 
at the recently reactivated base of Alakurtti south of Murmansk demon-
strates the importance Russia attaches to this particular military region, 
which remains a strategic nexus. This should not be overestimated howev-
er: according to the Estonian intelligence service’s most recent public report 
(March 2016), Russia can only field some 30 battalion-sized tactical groups 
in the whole of the Western Military District (from Kaliningrad to Vorku-
ta). Russia could also ramp up its military activities vis-à-vis Finland to lev-
els equal or superior to those to which Sweden and NATO countries in the 
Baltic Sea and North Atlantic have been subjected in recent years, including 
simulated strategic bombing attacks on critical Swedish installations. 
In NATO terms, an increased threat level vis-à-vis Finland as a NATO mem-
ber would be substantially easier to handle if Sweden were also in. The abil-
ity to provide timely NATO support and reinforcements to Finland would 
enhance the deterrent capabilities of the Finnish force structure and limit 
the risks of Russian miscalculation.
Conversely, in such a contingency, a stand-alone Finnish membership could 
lead NATO to propose additional military measures such as the preposi-
tioning of equipment packages along lines being implemented in the Bal-
tics and a substantial rotational NATO presence in Finland. Such measures 
could also be called for in order to facilitate the defence of Estonia and the 
other Baltic States. 
In the event of a conflict, NATO would also expect Finland to participate 
actively in the common defence, not least in the Baltic area: there would 
therefore be pressure on Finland to develop its beyond-the-borders capa-
bilities. However, to NATO planners, Finland’s territorial defence as a tool 
for deterrence-by-denial would appear to be the most important direct 
military asset that Finland could provide for the common defence. To the 
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extent that Finland attaches great value to its territorial defence, expedi-
tionary military contributions should not be allowed to dimension Finland’s 
defence effort. Participation in coalition operations may be politically and 
symbolically important but should not constitute a defining factor in force 
planning terms. From the NATO perspective, the existence of Finland’s ter-
ritorial defence as a member of NATO would cramp the military options of 
Russian force planners vis-à-vis the Baltic States. 
However, a much more agile Russian decision and implementation capabil-
ity will impose additional burdens in terms of response times on mobilisa-
tion-based territorial defence, whether or not Finland joins NATO.
NUCLEAR DIMENSION. In none of the membership options would there 
be any strategic or military reason for Finland to be invited to station nucle-
ar weapons on its territory or to acquire dual-capable aircraft. Strategic cou-
pling between the US and Europe does not require such measures. Indeed, 
for NATO, forward-basing such capabilities in Finland would be a factor of 
vulnerability as well as of escalation instability in the event of a “use-them 
or lose-them” situation.
3. Defence and military implications for Finland
From the NATO standpoint, Finland would fit readily into the NATO fam-
ily in practical terms. Its military forces meet NATO standards, and its 
defence and strategic posture vis-à-vis Russia is consistent with NATO aims 
and policies. From Finland’s perspective, the same remark applies: NATO 
policy and requirements are generally congruent with the needs of Finnish 
defence policy. 
DEFENCE PLANNING AND COMMAND STRUCTURE. As a member of 
NATO, Finland would be directly involved in NATO defence planning and in 
the command structure. This would represent a step-change vis-à-vis cur-
rent military cooperation by Finland with NATO: Finland would be part of 
the overall benchmarking process between the members, and a measure of 
coherence could be established between Finnish defence preparations and 
the collective and individual preparations of NATO and its members. The 
Finnish military and civil servants would have their billets in the NATO com-
mand structure: if Finland decides to join, it will want to carefully target 
those postings that would be the most important in its eyes.
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Given the recognised qualities of the Finnish politico-military establishment 
and its intimate cooperation with NATO and NATO partners, “plugging” 
into these aspects should be straightforward.
INTEROPERABILITY. As stated above, Finnish defence already enjoys 
a high degree of interoperability with NATO forces in general, and with 
those of its Scandinavian members more particularly. For instance, Finland 
is one of the very few non-NATO countries to be part of the Link 16 data 
exchange system between combat systems, such as its F-18 aircraft. With 
the exception of air surveillance and control, where there is substantial lee-
way for improvement, Finland is probably reaching the limit when it comes 
to generating increased interoperability with NATO (and therefore by ric-
ochet with the EU) without being a full member of the Alliance. Entering 
NATO’s full-spectrum planning process under the Defence Policy and Plan-
ning Committee (DPPC) will not be possible outside of full membership. 
The same applies to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), part 
of the enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF). The VJTF is optimised for 
Article 5 tasks.
FINNISH DEFENCE POSTURE. The current changes being mooted in Fin-
land in terms of the rapid activation of reservists and the more flexible use 
thereof are fully in line with the short-warning time threats which NATO 
aims to deter and, if need be, to defend against. 
If Russia were to substantially increase the forces arrayed in proximity to 
Finland (see Chapter III, section 2), Finland may have to review its disposi-
tions, for instance with further increases in readiness. It does not have the 
option of adopting the equivalent of Norway’s “Finnmark policy”, . For a 
power advancing from the East, Finnmark was a strategic dead end during 
the last World War and during the Cold War and remains so, unlike Finland 
whose territory opens access to the whole Baltic basin. Finland as a mem-
ber of NATO could draw on allied solidarity to buttress Finland’s defence in 
the form of prepositioned materiel and the more or less sustained presence 
of allied forces, with a view to reducing the risk of Russian miscalculation.
REGIONAL DEFENCE. Finland’s territorial defence does not lend itself 
readily to out-of-the-country military intervention. As stated above, the 
importance of territorial defence for Finland implies that expedition-
ary capabilities should not be developed to the point of making territori-
al defence unsustainable, and thus put the Baltic basin at risk. However, 
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Finland has already participated in military operations abroad, including 
in NATO and EU formats: with, in the past, up to 800 troops in KFOR 
Kosovo, a construction battalion in IFOR and SFOR Bosnia, and a compa-
ny-sized commitment in the German sector of ISAF Afghanistan. No less 
importantly, it is also a force contributor to NATO’s Response Force (NRF), 
an excellent school for developing interoperability.
In the event that Article 5 entered into play in defence of the Baltic States, 
only the major powers could provide heavy military muscle: Finland’s con-
tribution would in all cases be militarily limited. NATO’s Very High Readi-
ness Joint Task Force (VJTF) may play an important role in case of an Article 
5 crisis in the Baltic States. Finland as a possible NATO member could aim 
at providing a limited but cutting-edge contribution to that unit along with 
its existing participation in the NRF. The VJTF in totto is planned to encom-
pass some 5,000 soldiers from the overall NATO family. Overall, howev-
er, NATO membership should not lead Finland to develop its expeditionary 
component substantially.
INFRASTRUCTURE. Finland’s defence infrastructure is close to NATO 
standards (see above) and could be plugged into integrated NATO with-
out substantial difficulty if the basic mission is the defence of Finland. The 
most significant move would be the integration of Finland’s air surveillance 
and management networks with NATO’s Air Command and Control Sys-
tem (see chapter III, section 2).
If Sweden stays out of NATO, Finland would presumably be invited by 
NATO to also make its logistical infrastructure fit for use by NATO rein-
forcements to the Baltic States. The implications this would have from the 
Finnish standpoint would require a specific technical evaluation by Finland’s 
MoD in concert with NATO. 
NUCLEAR ISSUES. The assessors assume that Finland-in-NATO would 
not request the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory, nor that 
Finland would acquire combat aircraft on the basis of their ability to deliver 
nuclear weapons. However, Finland would have to decide whether it would 
join NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. For the time being, this is the case 
for 27 out of 28 members (only nuclear-armed France withholds its partic-
ipation). Belonging to the NPG provides participant states with informa-
tion on NATO’s nuclear doctrine and planning but does not imply partici-
pation in nuclear missions per se. Even NATO countries such as Denmark, 
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which objected publicly in the past to NATO nuclear policy, never ceased to 
be part of the NPG.
Members of NATO and of the NPG which do not have nuclear weap-
ons on their territory are not expected to task their combat aircraft with 
nuclear strike missions. They can nonetheless play a part in the execu-
tion of such missions in the form of a fighter escort or the suppression 
of enemy air defences (SEAD), for instance. That is a matter of national 
choice, however.
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE. Since NATO is a collective defence organisa-
tion, Finland alone or with Sweden would have the opportunity of exploiting 
its competitive advantage and thus be able to punch above its weight in the 
Alliance. Three areas (but others may exist as well) come to mind:
 ● Intelligence on Russia’s eastern approaches, from the White Sea 
southwards. Collecting and processing intelligence is not strictly a 
NATO task, since intelligence is usually not traded in multilateral 
contexts, but it naturally serves the collective defence. As Finland 
moves from a primarily counter-espionage posture to a broader 
spectrum intelligence-gathering policy, the country’s geographical 
location and deep knowledge of the region will give it substantial 
additional leverage. 
 ● Cyberdefence is another, already well-recognised area of Finnish 
expertise. Its ongoing participation in NATO’s Centre of Excellence in 
Tallinn sets a significant precedent in this regard. 
 ● So-called “hybrid” or “ambiguous” warfare is another field in which 
Finland has particular expertise due to the traditional Finnish concept 
of comprehensive security, which aims to increase the resilience of 
the whole of society. Hybrid warfare has already been the object of 
cooperation with NATO partners. Since “little green men” and other 
“soldiers without insignia” would presumably not enjoy a permissive 
environment in Finland, it is unclear whether this is a promising 
area for Finland to exploit in general. It could, however, function as 
a convenient vehicle for intra-regional cooperation with the Baltic 
States or serve in a CSDP framework if the EU were to set up a Hybrid 
Warfare Centre.
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DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AND SECURITY OF SUPPLY. With the 
important exception of ACCS (see above), NATO is no longer involved in 
the procurement of major equipment programmes. Conversely, it plays an 
essential role in setting norms and standards for defence systems. Being ful-
ly part of that process would be an improvement on the current situation. 
Today, Finland has little choice other than to acquire systems incorporating 
specifications which it has played no part in defining: this applies in practice 
not only to systems purchased abroad but also to those produced by Finn-
ish contractors. Given the quality but also the diversity of Finland’s defence 
industrial base, there should be little difficulty in exercising due influence. 
Finland’s policy of emphasising national control of acquisition choices may 
be somewhat easier to sustain in the multilateral NATO framework than in 
pursuing purely bilateral relations with the most powerful foreign suppliers, 
notably the US, as Sweden has done. 
NATO also plays a significant role in terms of providing logistical sup-
port, through the NSPA (NATO Supply and Procurement Agency) in Lux-
embourg and other agencies involved in the security of supply, including 
NATO’s pipeline system. The recent Host Nation Support Memorandum of 
Understanding concluded by Finland should facilitate peacetime coopera-
tion in this area, ahead of possible membership of the Organisation.
Finland places greater emphasis than most of NATO’s members on security 
of supply broadly conceived, notably in terms of sustaining economic activ-
ity in a crisis. There would be no reason for NATO membership to change 
that national policy, which has no downside for the Alliance. 
BUDGET IMPLICATIONS. NATO as such is a relatively low-cost organisa-
tion. Its annual infrastructure expenditure amounts to some EUR 5.2 bn. In 
view of Finland’s GDP as a proportion of NATO’s total, its share should be 
slightly in excess of 1%, meaning in practice less than EUR 55 million. These 
costs should rise in the near future given the currently unsatisfactory state of 
defence preparations in and towards the Baltic States. To this must be add-
ed the human resources cost of Finnish personnel working within the NATO 
framework in case of membership. NATO currently has an international staff 
of 1100, and 6700 military and civil servants in the command structure. Using 
the same ratio, this would represent about 80 people from Finland.
NATO’s benchmark for defence expenditure is set at 2% of GDP: out of 
28 members, only four countries (including neighbouring Estonia) meet it, 
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possibly joined by a fifth (Poland) in 2016. Finland’s defence budget of EUR 
2.69 billion stands at 1.3% of a GDP of EUR 207 billion. However, according 
to our assessment, the figure rises to EUR 3.41 billion and 1.64% of GDP on 
the basis of NATO definitions. To close the gap, annual expenditure would 
have to increase by approximately EUR 730 million. 
Preserving conscript-based territorial defence while increasing readiness 
and modernising the force structure (e.g. the upcoming combat aircraft and 
naval equipment purchases) will require an increase in spending, whether or 
not Finland joins NATO. 
4. Finland and NATO: strategic and political 
implications of accession
In empirical terms, the membership (or non-membership) of NATO does 
not appear to have a major bearing on the ability of a small country to exer-
cise diplomatic initiative on the global scene. Good offices, mediation or 
development policy are not variables which are tied to a country’s status in 
terms of collective defence. Norway has been no less dynamic and effective 
than Finland or Sweden in this respect.
The relationship between Finland and Russia is an asymmetric one and, 
whether as a part of Sweden or as an independent state, has been so for 
the past 300 years. This asymmetry has historically been managed through 
different strategies, co-operative relationships or even short-lived alliances 
with Russia (Sweden in the 1720s and during the final years of the Napo-
leonic Wars), alliances with other great powers to balance St. Petersburg/
Moscow, or by adopting a neutral or non-aligned policy. Finland pursued a 
policy of neutrality from the 1950s onwards – and Sweden for much longer, 
since 1814 – and, after the demise of the Soviet Union and joining the 
EU, military non-alignment. Since 2007, Finland no longer uses the term 
non-alignment to describe its foreign policy, while Sweden still does. It is 
simply stated that Finland does not belong to any military alliance.
Unlike Sweden, however, Finland – just like Norway – has a broad bilateral 
agenda with Russia and a long land/sea border.
Finland’s – and Sweden’s – future relations with NATO, which have 
developed markedly not least since the end of the Cold War, can for the 
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foreseeable future be contained schematically in four scenarios (see sec-
tion 2 above):
 ● Both Finland and Sweden stay outside the Alliance
 ● Finnish Alleingang: only Finland joins NATO
 ● Swedish Alleingang: only Sweden joins NATO
 ● Both countries join NATO
REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES. In the following, the three latter scenarios will 
be discussed assuming that neither the incumbent Finnish nor Swedish govern-
ments, barring some very dramatic occurrence in our neighbourhood, will act 
before the general elections in 2018 (Sweden) and 2019 (Finland) respectively.
Both countries have developed their relations with NATO in recent years. 
It is often argued that Finland and Sweden through membership of the 
Partnership for Peace Programme of 1994 and its Enhanced Opportunities 
Programme (EOP) follow-up of 2014 for all practical purposes are already 
members of the Alliance and seen as such by the outside world. The Host 
Nation Support agreement that both countries signed at the NATO Sum-
mit in Wales in 2014 is already in force in Finland and will go before the 
Swedish Riksdag this spring. It could reinforce the assumption that Fin-
land, and Sweden, would in all likelihood be part of a military conflict in the 
common strategic area of the Baltic Sea region by virtue of EU and bilateral 
commitments, and Western solidarity more broadly. 
Nevertheless, the political discussion that centres on the issue of application 
for NATO membership demonstrates that the application itself has high-
ly symbolic content politically. There is, of course, a distinction between a 
close co-operative relationship with NATO, such as the ones Finland and 
Sweden enjoy, and actual membership, whereby one signs up for the Arti-
cle 5 guarantees. A co-operative relationship, however close, does not in 
itself provide guarantees. Furthermore, membership, once in place, is more 
or less irreversible. No NATO country has ever seriously discussed leav-
ing the Alliance. France left the organisation and the integrated command 
structure in 1966 but stayed in the Alliance and rejoined in 2009. A co-op-
erative relationship could, in contrast, be terminated in parts or, which is 
unlikely, in its entirety or just lose its significance.
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An application should be seen as portending a major geopolitical change 
on the European map. Given the territorial size of Finland and Sweden, this 
would, in territorial terms, imply the single widest enlargement undertaken 
since Turkey and Greece joined in 1952. The direct border between NATO 
and Russia would increase by a factor of two and make the Baltic Sea, with 
the exception of the innermost part of the Gulf of Finland and the Kalinin-
grad exclave, a “NATO sea”. After all, it is already an “EU sea”. It will thus 
constitute a considerable change of the territorial composition of the Alli-
ance. The comparison with Turkey and Greece goes further: Finland, Swe-
den, and Norway are also “flank countries”.
Finnish membership of NATO would evidently strengthen Finland’s imme-
diate security as it would be included in the Article 5 guarantees, and 
strengthen the deterrence of any potential attack against the country. 
Membership would probably also lead to a serious crisis with Russia, for 
an undefined period of time. While tension would mount, open conflict 
would not necessarily ensue as Russia would be aware that any transgres-
sion would engage the whole Alliance. 
Since joining NATO, successive Norwegian governments have attempted to 
combine deterrence with reassurance. Norway promised not to station nucle-
ar weapons or foreign troops on its soil in peacetime, nor to hold military exer-
cises in the Finnmark region. Similar unilateral self-imposed restrictions could 
be adopted by Finland (and/or Sweden), but presumably excluding a Finn-
mark-type regime for any portion of Finland’s territory. Interestingly enough, 
such restrictions do not seem to have been discussed when Turkey joined, even 
though that country had a long direct border with the Soviet Union.
If Finland chose to apply for NATO membership, it would constitute a signif-
icant political defeat for Moscow. Russian efforts to convey repeated warning 
signals against joining in past years would have failed. It may be considered par-
adoxical that Russia is trying to prevent Finnish and/or Swedish membership of 
the Alliance by intimidation rather than reassurance. This, however, seems to 
conform to past Russian and Soviet practices and political culture. Moscow’s 
argument is that whatever it does is in response to aggressive NATO moves.
ON THE ACCESSION PROCEDURE. It should be noted that the pace of 
possible accession can have effects of its own. Membership processes can 
be more or less prolonged depending on the state of decision-making in 
an applicant country and the views existing NATO countries have as to the 
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desirability of, or readiness for, full membership. A Finnish application in 
the foreseeable future would, apart from doubling NATO’s direct border 
with Russia, probably take place in a charged international situation. As the 
domestic political process in Finland would require several months, approv-
al by Parliament and, possibly, a referendum campaign, the country could 
be exposed to strong pressure from Russia. If Sweden were to apply simul-
taneously, the whole application process would be protracted, since a ref-
erendum in that country is, in the view of the Swedish establishment, a nat-
ural element of the accession process. How this would play out in Finland is 
uncertain. Public opinion will be an important part of the accession process.
Referendum processes always run into the problem of how to phrase the 
question, since this will inevitably influence the outcome. In the case of 
EU accession, the agreement reached was put to referenda in both Finland 
and Sweden8. In Sweden, as in Denmark, a referendum also took place on 
whether or not to join the EMU. 
A possible Finnish decision to apply for NATO membership would be tak-
en by the President on the basis of a motion proposed by the Government. 
Before this takes place, the Government would present a report to the Par-
liament, and the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee would be contin-
uously informed about the process and the negotiations. If the outcome of 
negotiations were decided to be put to a referendum, a specific law would 
need to be stipulated accordingly. After the referendum, the Parliament 
would have to approve the agreement on Finland’s accession, whereafter 
the President would take the final decision on membership. 
The Swedish constitution, for its part, provides for both decisive and con-
sultative referenda, the former only in relation to constitutional issues. 
However, in practice, the difference between the two forms is not that 
significant, as even a consultative referendum is seen as decisive. If and 
when there is a broad consensus that Sweden should apply for member-
ship of NATO, it may well be a condition for Social Democratic support 
that an enabling referendum be held on whether to apply or not. This 
is widely seen as the politically central point in an accession process. In 
Sweden, foregoing an enabling referendum in favour of the Finnish mod-
el may lead to accusations that the Government is trying to prejudice 
8  A separate referendum was held in the Åland Islands a few weeks after the referendum in mainland Finland. Accession referenda also took place 
in Ireland (1972), Norway (1972, 1994), Denmark (1972), Austria (1994), and in 2003 in Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, as well as Croatia (2012).
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the outcome of the political process by applying without a clear political 
mandate.
FAST TRACK? Given this background, the issue of a possible fast-track 
procedure would in all likelihood be discussed, whereby Article 5 commit-
ments would be declared to operate even before Finland (and Sweden) had 
become full members. This would be the first time such a procedure would 
be used by NATO. The high degree of overall interoperability between 
NATO and Finland and Sweden would make this technically a straightfor-
ward option. The downside to this approach is, of course, that if there were 
a “no” in a referendum (as there was on the single currency in Sweden), the 
Alliance would be bound by the Treaty to rescind the previous decision, with 
the ensuing very negative consequences. The incumbent government could 
be accused of deserting the operating grand strategy, only to be forced to 
change it back once again. A publicised fast-track procedure could, in prac-
tice, and paradoxically, galvanise the membership opponents as they could 
claim that the Alliance was trying to prejudice the outcome of a democratic 
process. A fast-track procedure, while obviously important from a security 
standpoint, would be fraught with internal political complications.
NEIGHBOURS. No doubt, the Baltic States would view Finnish membership 
and extending the NATO-Russia border as contributing to shifting the ten-
sion between them and Russia to the north. Finnish accession could, as it 
were, entail sharing the burden of tension along a much longer NATO-Russia 
frontier. They would no longer, with Norway and Poland, be the only front-
line states. Should Sweden also apply, this would in practical terms greatly 
increase the strategic depth of Baltic defence and transform the Nordic/Bal-
tic area into a common strategic space. This would facilitate further military 
integration between the Baltic States and the new member(s). Defending 
these republics today is a logistical challenge of the first order. 
What reactions could be expected from within the Alliance, should Fin-
land and Sweden apply? Some member states on the southern tier might 
feel that attention could shift from their concerns to the North. Converse-
ly, some may fear that Finland – with regard to its long border with Rus-
sia and history of trying to find a modus vivendi with its great power neigh-
bour – would hamper efforts to oppose Moscow more robustly. Others 
may feel that if Finnish/Swedish membership does lead to increased tension 
in Europe, then the Alliance is creating more problems than it will solve; 
hence, they could believe that it might be better to leave things as they are. 
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Others could hesitate to take on Article 5 guarantees for a country with 
such an exposed geographical position as that of Finland: this argument is 
sometimes heard in the case of a possible Finnish Alleingang. However, the 
reality within the Alliance is one of a low degree of apprehension vis-à-vis 
potential membership by Finland and Sweden: acceptability of membership 
is high, even if views are not as clearly set on its desirability. As indicated in 
our meetings, however, a Swedish Alleingang, despite its operational advan-
tages, is seen as problematic politically and strategically, as it would iso-
late Finland. In the case of Finland, the combination of military seriousness 
along with a proven track record of managing its “Russian agenda” is an 
asset even if each of its components can draw reservations of the sort indi-
cated a few lines earlier.
Both countries are seen as fully-fledged Western powers with an prov-
en track record as members of the EU and partners of NATO. Within the 
Alliance, they would be less contentious than the post-Cold War eastward 
expansion of NATO.
Under the prevailing political and strategic circumstances, we foresee a low 
probability of NATO deciding to close the door on further enlargement, but 
it has to be mentioned if only because of its potentially severe consequences 
for Finland (and Sweden). Furthermore, something of the sort has happened 
to the EU’s own enlargement process, which has slowed down dramatically 
in recent years, with no clear prospect of early enlargement to the candidate 
states of the Western Balkans. If a door-closing (Torschluss) policy took place 
in NATO, Finland would no longer be able to use the possibility –as well as 
the reality – of NATO membership as a tool to master the inescapable geo-
political dilemma posed by its unpredictable neighbour. Finland’s range of 
available policy options would be reduced. There is no push in NATO today 
for a Torschluss but this could change over time if America’s commitments in 
Asia were to lead the US to decrease its engagement in Europe.
As a flank country, Finland can also draw some lessons from the experi-
ence of Turkey, which had a long common border with the Soviet Union 
(Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijan SSRs) and was admitted into NATO in 
1952 during the Korean War – namely in a very tense international situa-
tion – and which covered about the same expanse of territory as Finland 
and Sweden, around 800,000 square km. However, there are several dif-
ferences between the two cases. Given Russia’s historical claims on con-
trol of the Turkish Straits, there was a strong consensus in Turkey about the 
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wish to become a member of the Alliance. Several of the founding mem-
bers saw Turkey as a part of the Middle East, possibly entailing diverting 
resources from the North or Central front. However, strong commitment 
in the Korean War (with the distinguished participation of a full combat bri-
gade) and NATO’s first SACEUR, General Eisenhower9, were the two fac-
tors behind the decision to let Turkey in. It is interesting to note that the 
USSR, which had attempted in 1946 to secure rights over the control of 
the Straits, did not react with any particular vigour vis-à-vis Turkey’s (and 
Greece’s) entry into NATO.
Apart from its political ramifications, a Finnish application would focus atten-
tion on the importance of several geographical areas in Russia, namely St. 
Petersburg on the one hand, and Murmansk and Arkhangelsk on the other. 
The former region has always been sensitive, ever since it was found-
ed in 1703, and has contributed to several wars between first Sweden and 
then Finland and Russia. Today, the area is Russia’s second major econom-
ic engine, the closest major region to the borders of NATO. The distance 
from the Finnish border to St. Petersburg is less than 200 km.
The other region of Russia where NATO proximity would be seen as par-
ticularly sensitive is the Kola Peninsula, still the only home to Russian sec-
ond strike capabilities in the form of nuclear submarines, with Murmansk 
located less than 200 km from the Finnish border. While the Murmansk 
area was no less important during the Cold War, it remains central to Rus-
sian claims to nuclear superpower status. Nuclear weapons again play a very 
visible role in Russian defence strategy and policy. Even if Finland were to 
follow Norwegian self-imposed restrictions when it comes to stationing 
nuclear weapons and foreign forces on its territory, Russia could seek to 
increase its forces in the North to protect the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk 
regions and their land communications with the rest of Russia (see Chap-
ter II). As discussed above, this could in turn generate discussions about 
a NATO presence in Finland, which could collide with unilateral Finnish 
undertakings of the Norwegian model.
The argument could be made that since Russia has been living with NATO 
proximity to Murmansk for rather a long time, it could do so also with Fin-
land in the Alliance. But from the Russian standpoint, there may be a dif-
9  * Before General Eisenhower became a candidate in the November 1952 presidential elections.
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ference between the two cases. Nuclear submarines based in Kola and the 
growing economic importance of the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean are 
issues which appeared on the scene well after the founding of the Alliance.. 
Finnish membership could be interpreted as a move closer to the Kola Pen-
insula by the Alliance.
While Finnish territory would be important in any conflict around the Baltic 
Sea, Russia’s strategic problems would be compounded if Sweden were to 
apply for membership as well. If NATO could use both Finnish and Swedish 
territory without restriction in such a conflict, the prospects for the Alliance 
to manage hostilities between Russia and one or two Baltic States would 
improve considerably. The extent to which Finnish and Swedish member-
ship would change the strategic importance of the adjacent military regions 
in Russian eyes, as compared with other regions, is difficult to measure as it 
in all likelihood is connected with the general state of affairs between Rus-
sia and its adversaries, and possible conflicts elsewhere. But it is a reason-
able assumption that more resources would be devoted to the Northwest.
ON RUSSIA’S POTENTIAL RESPONSE. Russia is not at ease with itself 
and the world. During the last fifteen years, Russia has turned into a unsat-
isfied power, questioning post-Cold War arrangements in Europe and even 
the norms and principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Paris 
Charter of 1990. Russia considers itself disadvantaged by the state of affairs 
in Europe. The view that Russia is not just another European state is largely 
shared by the Russian elite. This sets Russia apart and leads to a revisionist 
stand demanding a renegotiation of European security structures and even 
demanding the recognition of spheres of special interest, in other words a 
veto over developments that impinge on Russia’s interests. Due to historical 
experience, this would be unpalatable for Finland. In particular, the enlarge-
ment of NATO is seen as a threat, driven by the United States, and aimed 
at bringing American military bases and forces closer to Russian borders to 
contain Russia. 
Russia shares a land border with fourteen states from North Korea to Nor-
way. Its borders have historically been porous as there are few barriers. This 
partly explains the innate difficulty Russia has in dealing with its neigh-
bours. Not a single conflict in the post-Soviet sphere has been settled. All 
remain simmering and are known as frozen conflicts, guaranteeing in most 
cases a degree of droit-de-regard for Moscow but concurrently hampering 
economic and human contacts with manifold consequences. 
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Despite the fact that the Soviet Union never fully embraced the Finn-
ish policy of neutrality, present-day Russia has never questioned Finland’s 
integration into Western structures. In general, Russia, like the USSR, 
remains sceptical vis-à-vis all grey zone arrangements including neutral-
ity, non-alignment and so forth, particularly towards closer cooperation 
with NATO, which Russia today regards as its adversary. Any enlargement 
of NATO would be a political defeat for Moscow as it notes in the latest 
update of its National Security Strategy from December 2015. It states that 
further enlargement of NATO and the moving of its military infrastructure 
closer to Russian borders constitute a threat to Russian national security. 
In the event of Finnish membership, the long common border would only 
underscore the geopolitical change. 
Continued cooperation with NATO, enhanced partnership and the right 
and possibility to apply for membership, as well as a deepening of mili-
tary integration with Sweden plus intensive political and military-techni-
cal cooperation with the United States are all developments eyed closely 
by Moscow, but usually commented on below the government level. But 
a possible Finnish (and/or Swedish) membership of NATO would trigger a 
Russian response. The geopolitical change would be too major for Mos-
cow to ignore. Fenno-Russian relations would take a beating and the polit-
ical reaction would be harsh and probably also “personal”, as in the case 
of the downing of a Russian fighter plane by the Turkish Air Force during 
the Syrian conflict. The unexpected and unprovoked breach of the border 
regime in Northern Finland in late 2015 is an example of Russia’s propen-
sity to create a problem, then leverage it and offer to manage it without 
necessarily solving it. Russian reactions could also include increased pres-
sure on the borders with the Baltic States. An attempt to politically acti-
vate the ethnic Russians living in Finland may also be considered. Dur-
ing the accession process, the atmosphere would be poisoned and trade 
could be badly hit, along lines currently experienced in the Turkish-Rus-
sian dispute. As a backdrop to the domestic enlargement debate, the tra-
ditional Finnish bilateral agenda would be in a shambles, even if Norway’s 
ability as a NATO member to sustain a similar “Russian agenda” points to 
the reversibility of such a state of affairs. 
More often than not, the Soviet Union’s and Russia’s track record towards 
successive NATO enlargements has followed a repetitive sequence: first, 
opposition, indeed sometimes strident opposition backed by political and 
economic pressure, then tacit acquiescence and eventually a return to 
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the diplomatic and economic status quo ante once enlargement has tak-
en place. Turkey (1952), the Federal Republic of Germany (1955), the exten-
sion of NATO to the territory of the former German Democratic Republic 
(1990), Poland (1999), and the Baltic States (2004) were the most sali-
ent episodes fitting into this pattern.10 Ukraine and Georgia have been the 
exceptions to this pattern, underscored by ostentatious and credibly backed 
red lines in a manner not present in other cases. 
THE WILL TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY. The will to defend the country 
reflects historical identities and their role in security and defence policy. The 
Finnish will to defend the country has always been extremely high, reaching 
levels of around 80%. More or less the same level of each cohort completes 
military service. The assumption that NATO membership would weaken 
this will is just that, an assumption, although it is used in the Finnish debate. 
It is difficult to see any direct linkage between NATO membership and the 
will to defend. Like now, the willingness is likely to depend on the method 
for formulating the division of responsibilities for defending the country by 
policies and in political debate. The starting point for NATO membership is 
national defence, which will be coordinated at the NATO level and support-
ed by joint structures. 
The high level of readiness to defend Finland has been well documented 
in polls conducted systematically for decades. It has not fluctuated to any 
great degree because of changes in the security political situation in North-
ern Europe. However, the recent developments in Russia and its aggressive 
posture are factors that influence this will to defend. 
The most important explanation remains history, the legacy of having 
survived the war, and avoiding occupation. The unbroken military tradi-
tion perpetuated in the form of conscription, which covers almost eighty 
per cent of the male population, has in popular terms kept the tradition 
alive. Refresher training and the large number of reservists who have vol-
unteered for service in the UN and other peacekeeping operations has fur-
ther confirmed the image of the Defence Forces. Their ability to modernise 
10  It is also worth noting the as-of-now moderate reaction towards Montenegro’s ongoing entry into NATO. Although Montenegro is out of Rus-
sian’s military reach and has little military importance of its own, strong emotional religious and political bonds have existed historically between 
Russia and Montenegro. Yet, in political and diplomatic terms, Russia’s political response has been muted. Nor has Montenegro, a favourite holiday 
spot for wealthy Russian, been the object of economic sanctions as yet.
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and purchase cutting-edge equipment like the F-18 Hornet fighter aircraft 
has enhanced their credibility. Universal conscription also remains the sole 
recruitment avenue for the officer corps and the NCOs. 
Increased military co-operation with Sweden generally remains popular. 
The same applies to peacekeeping operations. This is also the case for con-
scripts and reservists when it comes to manoeuvres with NATO troops. It 
is very difficult to extrapolate any trends as to how the will to defend would 
be affected by Finland’s possible NATO membership.
FINLAND AND SWEDEN: JOINTLY OR SEPARATELY? If Finland were to 
apply unilaterally with Sweden staying out for reasons of its own, Finland’s 
strategic situation would be rather exposed. It would then stand alone as a 
NATO strategic outpost, with its only land connection with the Alliance a 
largely uninhabited, mountainous and inaccessible border area with Nor-
way in the far North. The prospect of the Alliance assisting Finland with-
out the use of Swedish territory is hard to imagine. The presence of Russian 
naval forces in the Gulf of Finland, furthermore, could make the connec-
tions with the nearest NATO land territory in Estonia precarious. 
A similar Swedish unilateral move could increase Finnish exposure to Rus-
sia. Such considerations were important to the Swedish government dur-
ing the Cold War, when joining NATO was discarded as it could make Fin-
land’s relations with the USSR even more complicated – with the ensuing 
multiple effects on Sweden. “Back to the future” is a concept that no Swed-
ish government would countenance lightly. It would create a “Finland ques-
tion” for Sweden that it does not have at present.
It would seem that while a common Finnish and Swedish application for 
membership would entail a considerable change in the political geography 
of Europe, with the ensuing risks of at least temporarily augmented ten-
sion between NATO and Russia, it is, in strategic terms, clearly preferable 
to either a Finnish or Swedish Alleingang. A Finnish unilateral approach to 
the Alliance would create serious logistical problems for NATO, magnify-
ing the problems that the Baltic States present, since there would be no real 
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territorial contiguity between the new member and the Alliance. A Swed-
ish unilateral move could lead to a return to a Cold War scenario, where-
by Finland would have to tread carefully to maintain a reasonable balance 
between Russia and the Alliance and rely upon Sweden to act as a bridge. 
This, in turn, would also involve serious diplomatic and other challenges for 
Stockholm.
A Finnish – and Swedish – application for membership of the Alliance is 
an issue of great strategic importance, not only for the possible applicant 
countries but also for the Alliance. It is, in essence, a question of grand 
strategy, which has to be considered thoroughly. Small nations do not often 
change their basic foreign policy guidelines. They are more dependent on 
continuity than great powers. Any change would also need a domestic con-
sensus for it to gain legitimacy at home and abroad. 
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CONCLUSION
In closing, we wish to underscore the following points.
SEA CHANGE. First, a decision to join the Atlantic Alliance and its Arti-
cle 5 collective defence commitment would represent a sea change, trans-
forming Finland’s security policy overall, and its relationship with Russia in 
particular. Paradoxically, the deepest effects would not be in the sphere of 
military policy and dispositions: membership of NATO would not entail a 
marked departure from the long-standing Finnish choice in favour of a con-
script-based territorial defence. The shift would be geopolitical and strate-
gic in nature, as momentous, for example , as Sweden’s decision to become 
neutral some two centuries ago, or Poland joining NATO at the end of the 
nineties. These were decisions conceived for the long haul, which trans-
formed the positioning of these states as political and strategic actors. In 
other words, the decision to join NATO would not be a mere incremental 
extension of Finland’s increasingly close partnership with NATO.
TIMING. Second, in the security of countries, the timing of decisions is of 
the essence. Nor should decisions be rushed. An accession process should 
be based on the dual understanding that it is a long-term commitment and 
that applying for membership could be difficult once a strategic storm has 
broken. Symmetrically, a decision to pursue the current policy of coopera-
tion with NATO short of membership should be viewed in the same light. 
The possibility to apply for membership remains a tool to master the geo-
political dilemma posed by an unpredictable neighbour. 
JOINT DECISION. Finally, we repeatedly received confirmation of the prop-
osition that the effects of possible NATO membership would be consider-
ably more benign for Finland if such a decision were made in a coordinat-
ed manner by Finland and Sweden, than if Finland joined alone. Similarly, 
a Swedish decision to join NATO and a Finnish decision not to join would 
leave Finland isolated and exposed.
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List of operations
AMIS  African Union’s Enhanced Mission to Sudan / Darfur
EUTM Somalia European Union Training Mission Somalia
IFOR/SFOR Implementation Force/Stabilisation Force 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
KFOR Kosovo Force
MINURCAT II Second Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSMA Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
OIR  Operation Inherent Resolve
OPCW/UN Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons/ 
United Nations Joint Mission
OSCE MTG Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to Georgia
OSGAP Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
RSM Resolute Support mission
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF I  First United Nations Emergency Force
UNEF II Second United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP  United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHQ United Nations Headquarters
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNISOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOP United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka 
UNOGIL United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNSMIS United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
UNTAES United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia,  
Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
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